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Abstract
Government Hesitancy amidst Industry Discord: Decline of the United States Flag
Merchant Marine after World War II
Deborah J. Hennen

The American-flag merchant marine became the world’s largest during World
War II. U.S.-flag ships carried most of the nation’s commerce, and the world looked to
America for shipping strength. After the war, the different parties in the maritime
industry began to fight for their individual interests as the American standard of living
became the highest in the world. The federal government hesitated to step in and calm
the growing discord, and several decades passed as American maritime policy stagnated.
Only after the parties in the industry began cooperating with each other did Congress take
positive steps to aid the American-flag merchant marine, but it still hesitated when
industry disagreement or American foreign policy concerns surfaced. Since the U.S.
government today remains ambivalent toward its national merchant fleet, cooperation by
the parties comprising the maritime industry will be the only road toward recovery of a
strong American-flag merchant marine.
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Chapter 1: The American-Flag Merchant Marine
The American-flag merchant ship Marine Electric carried bulk cargos along the
east coast of the United States. It was constructed of the bow and stern sections of a T-2
tanker built in 1944. It was fitted with a midsection built in 1962. In the early 1980s, the
Marine Electric was carrying coal along the East Coast of the United States. The ship
departed Norfolk, Virginia early on the morning of February 11, 1983 and began its final
voyage northbound with a load of coal bound for Brayton Point, Massachusetts. The
weather forecast announced winds of 25-35 knots for the outbound trip, but the ship had
endured similar weather before with little problem.
Early on the morning of February 12, 1983, the off-duty crew of the Marine
Electric was awakened and told to muster with their lifejackets at the starboard lifeboat.
The captain, mate on watch, and helmsman began to notice that the ship’s bow was
settling lower in the water as the ship progressed up the coast. The Marine Electric was
taking on water at the bow and was sinking. A gale blew and temperatures neared
freezing. The ship began to list about 10º to starboard, but the starboard lifeboat could
still be launched if necessary. After everyone was prepared, but before the captain had a
chance to give the order to abandon ship, the Marine Electric took one final roll to
starboard and pitched the crew waiting by the lifeboat into the water. The ship then
capsized, trapping the remaining crew on board. The crewmen in the water faced the
gale and freezing temperatures until the U.S. Coast Guard and other ships in the area
could reach them. When the rescuers arrived, only three men were still alive. In all, the
rescuers recovered three survivors and 24 bodies of the crew of the Marine Electric.

1

2
Seven crewmen were never found, including the captain and several engineers who may
have been trapped below deck when the ship capsized. 1
The Marine Electric incident is a telling example of the demise of the U.S.-flag
merchant fleet after World War II. Ships built in a hurry to fulfill wartime needs were
sold to commercial interests and operated well past their intended and useful lives.
Shipowners were motivated to keep the American flag flying on their ships by preference
cargoes that were very profitable and were only allowed by law to be carried by U.S.-flag
ships. In order to operate on domestic trade routes or to carry government-sponsored
cargoes, the law not only required that the ship be registered in the United States, but that
it be American built. Although business interests did develop and build new ships to
meet the needs of a changing world, the old ships were kept operating in order to save
money and increase profits.
The American-flag merchant marine developed throughout the twentieth century
under several complex subsidy systems. The U.S. government had supported its
merchant marine with direct and indirect subsidies since the formation of the United
States as a sovereign nation. Of the indirect subsidies, one of the most restrictive has
been in effect in some form since 1789, requiring that ships registered under the
American flag be built in the United States. Today, this law is one of the most protective
measures employed in retaining an American flag coastwise fleet and is embodied in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, more commonly known as the Jones Act. 2 Since this
1

U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Casualty Report, SS Marine
Electric, O.N. 245675, Capsizing and Sinking in the Atlantic Ocean on 12 February 1983 with Multiple
Loss of Life. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report and Commandant’s Action, 25 July
1984.
2

U. S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Administration. Compilation of Maritime Laws
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), 307-311; 46 USC App. 877 (2004).
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paper deals mainly with the interactions of the American-flag merchant marine in
international trade, a comprehensive study of the implications of the Jones Act on the
American-flag fleet is not addressed here. However, the linkage of American ship
registry to the American shipbuilding industry was an important factor not only under the
Jones Act for domestic trade, but also for development of an international American fleet.
In the early twentieth century, for a shipowner to register a ship under the
American flag, law required him to build the ship in the United States. In addition, the
government offered monetary promotional programs to American ships. For example,
the Merchant Marine Act of 1928 provided for mail subsidies to shipowners. Corruption
and mismanagement of subsidy money led to big corporate profits, but not to a viable
American-flag merchant marine. 3
In an attempt to continue aid to the American merchant marine but to correct the
flaws of the Merchant Marine Act of 1928, in 1936, President Franklin Roosevelt signed
into law a revised Merchant Marine Act. To today, the policy embodied in this act has
remained substantially the same. 4 The 1936 act promoted subsidies to the maritime
3

René De La Pedraja, The Rise and Decline of U. S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Twayne Publishers, 1992), 111.
4

Title I-Declaration of Policy of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 reads as follows:
SEC. 101. FOSTERING DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF MERCHANT MARINE.
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that the
United States shall have a merchant marine (a) sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce and a
substantial portion of the water-borne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to
provide shipping service on all routes (deleted by Merchant Marine Act of 1970) essential for maintaining
the flow of such domestic and foreign water-borne commerce at all times, (b) capable of serving as a naval
and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, (c) owned and operated under the United
States flag by citizens of the United States insofar as may be practicable, (d) composed of the bestequipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United States and manned with a
trained and efficient citizen personnel, and (e) supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding and ship
repair (added by Merchant Marine Act of 1970). It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States
to foster the development and encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine. Compilation of
Maritime Laws, 1; 46 U.S.C. App. 1101 (2004); U.S. Congress, 74th Cong., 2nd sess., Ch. 858, Merchant
Marine Act of 1936, Title I, Sec. 101, 29 June 1936. (Italics indicates changes that were made by the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970.)

4
industry, while attempting to administer them more evenly than had the 1928 act by
constructing new ships that could compete with foreign shipping interests. The 1936 act
also made allowance for subsidy money to compensate for higher operating costs
incurred by shipowners, including higher labor costs of employing American officers and
seamen.
At the turn of the twentieth century, shipowners and their associates often
exploited merchant seamen. Shipowners hired shipping agents to find seamen to man
their ships. These agents cheated many seamen out of their wages by overcharging them
for room and board in boarding houses ashore, which in turn caused seamen to be
indebted to them. A vicious cycle of exploitation for profit developed since the seamen
would then be required to ship out just to pay the agents. Aboard ship, living quarters
were small, overcrowded, and unsanitary. The food was often of the poorest quality and
rotten. 5
Prior to the passage of the LaFollette Seamen’s Act of 1915, shipowners were
required to hire American officers, but could employ unlicensed seamen from anywhere
in the world. American officers received higher wages than those of other nationalities,
and seamen employed on board American-flag ships were also paid higher wages than on
the ships of other nations even though they were not American citizens. 6 The LaFollette
Seamen’s Act required owners, in addition to hiring American officers, to employ
seamen of which at least 75% were fluent in English. 7 Higher wages resulted, prompting

5

Bruce Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront: Seamen, Longshoremen, and Unionism in the 1930s
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 11-18.
6

Paul Maxwell Zeis, American Shipping Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938), 46.

7

De La Pedraja, Rise and Decline of U. S. Merchant Shipping, 16.

5
shipowners to seek government subsidies in order to allow them to compete for profit in
the foreign trades.
The LaFollette Seamen’s Act began a surge of labor activism in the maritime
industry that peaked in the 1930s. Longshoremen and seamen organized into unions and
attempted to gain a better standard of living and working environment. They fought to
end shipping agent abuses and to better the conditions aboard ship. Leaders in the
maritime industry began to organize both shipboard and shoreside workers, resulting in
the formation of several different maritime unions. Leaders who were instrumental to
this organizing effort were Harry Bridges and Harry Lundeberg.
Harry Bridges, an Australian, was raised in a middle class English family. Later,
as he traveled the world as a seaman, Bridges developed a feeling that “there was
something wrong with the system,” especially as he encountered poor conditions in ports
around the world. 8 Combined with his involvement in the Australian labor movement,
this experience led him later to affiliate with radical unions such as the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW) and eventually with the Communist party, even though
Bridges always maintained that he was not a member. 9 Bridges’ acceptance of
Communist ideologies placed him at odds with another major leader in maritime
unionization, Harry Lundeberg. This split between the different labor unions led to many
years of dispute that added to disruption in the industry.
Maritime unions gained ground by using the strike as a major tool, but during
World War II, seamen, in support of the war effort, agreed to a no-strike policy. They
were also subject to the War Labor Board’s regulations pertaining to wages for the
8

Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront, 26-27.

9

Nelson, Workers on the Waterfront, 60, 66, 145, 263-266.

6
duration of the war. War policies such as extra pay for ship operations in a war zone kept
the wages of seamen higher than during peacetime. After the war, when these bonuses
were eliminated, the seamen again began to bargain collectively, but in separate groups
embracing different ideologies. Consequently wages rose, making ship operation more
expensive on American-flag ships. 10
The United States had emerged from World War II as one of the strongest nations
in the world. Europe had been decimated by the war, and the United States took charge
in the European recovery effort. World War II was not only a conflict between the Allied
and Axis powers. World economic competition did not cease due to the exigencies of
war. The United States and Great Britain, though allies in war, remained economic
competitors throughout the conflict.
At the end of World War II, the United States led the world in merchant shipping.
The U.S. built Liberty ships and T-2 tankers in such large quantities to win the Battle of
the Atlantic and aid the Allied victory that many ships remained at the end of hostilities.
Even though these ships were built poorly and had difficulty even when new, it was
imperative to the war effort for ship production to continue on a large scale. Despite
knowing that the ships had structural problems, the United States government sold many
of them to commercial interests after the war in order to put the merchant marine back
into private hands from almost total government operation. War-built ships were
modified and refitted with new cargo sections and continued to operate in American trade
into the 1980s. The Marine Electric was one of these ships.

10

U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Labor-Management
Problems of the American Merchant Marine, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 11 July 1955, 444.

7
In the post-war world shaped by economic competition between nations, costs
became the main concern of shipowners. As maritime unions gained better conditions
and wages for seamen, American shipowners turned from the American flag and sought
lower operating costs through open ship registries that came to be known as flags of
convenience. Under a flag of convenience registry, a shipowner paid lower taxes, faced
less regulatory restriction, and could choose labor from anywhere in the world. The
American government supported the advancement and continued use of flags of
convenience in the world market. U.S. political leaders like former Secretary of
Commerce W. Averell Harriman and former Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius
actively patronized and/or developed flag of convenience registries.
On board flag of convenience ships, foreign seamen shipped out just as American
seamen had over a century ago: under shipping agents. Like the shipping agents used by
American shipowners in the early twentieth century, foreign shipping agents linked to
flag of convenience ships took advantage of the foreign seamen whose interests they
were hired to protect. Shipowners would abandon their ships without paying the crew,
and shipping agents would take fees for jobs that didn’t exist, sending seamen to foreign
ports at their own expense when no job was forthcoming. 11 Seamen on board many flag
of convenience ships were also not provided with necessary safety and lifesaving
equipment comparable to that which was required by law on board an American-flag
ship. 12

11

Paul K. Chapman, Trouble on Board: The Plight of International Seafarers (Ithaca: ILR Press,
1992), 22-23, 30-31.
12

See William Langewiesche, The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos, and Crime (New
York: North Point Press, 2004), 8-31.

8
Flag of convenience registries not only hurt American-flag shipping, but also
attracted ships away from many of the European countries that had strong maritime
traditions. Some of these countries tried to keep their shipowners from fleeing their
national flags by adopting international registries. This type of registry, similar to the
open registry, relaxed many of the regulations for documenting a ship. Choice of labor,
lower taxation, and reduced registration fees were offered to tempt shipowners who had
already shifted to flag of convenience registries back to their home nations. Norway,
Denmark, Germany, and France offered international registries for ships flying their
national flags. 13 Nevertheless, open registries continued to spread. (See Table I.)
In addition to the challenge presented to the American-flag fleet by foreign
competition, technological advances in cargo handling and methods of propulsion also
changed the industry. The introduction of containerization by Malcolm McLean led to
bigger ships that required fewer workers. In the engine room, automation and more
efficient engines eliminated other workers. But even as technology advanced in the
American maritime industry, the older World War II-era ships still operated in
commercial trade. The subsidy scheme of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 no longer
provided the needed assistance to upgrade the entire American-flag fleet. The 1936 act
was amended in 1970, but still fell short of revitalizing the industry.
As the American-flag fleet shrunk in the 1980s when many wartime ships were
finally scrapped, the parties in the industry began to be more understanding of each

13

N. Shashikumar, “Comparative Maritime Policies: A U.S. Dilemma,” Transportation Journal,
34, no. 1 (Fall 1994): 34; N. Shashikumar, “World Shipping Competition,” in William A. Lovett, United
States Shipping Policies and the World Market (Westport: Quorum Books, 1996), 93-95.

9
other’s concerns. Once they began to cooperate amongst themselves and with each other,
Congress responded with new programs to boost the American-flag merchant marine.
Historiography on the decline of the American-flag merchant marine is as
extensive and complicated as the maritime industry itself. Many works are very broad in
the time periods they study, such as A Maritime History of the United States: The Role of
America’s Seas and Waterways where Jack Bauer only dedicates a few short chapters to
post-World War II study; and Sailing on Friday: The Perilous Voyage of America’s
Merchant Marine by John A. Butler who begins in colonial times and, like Bauer, only
devotes a few chapters to post-war maritime activity. 14 Wide overviews of the entire
industry from before its inception as a national entity, while important to the greater body
of maritime history, lend little to pinpoint why the merchant fleet has declined to its
present state. The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy by
Andrew Gibson, a former Maritime Administrator under Richard Nixon, and Arthur
Donovan, a professor at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, contains more policy
suggestion than analysis of what happened to the U.S.-flag merchant fleet. Gibson and
Donovan suggest that U.S. maritime policy was not adequate to maintain a viable
American-flag merchant fleet because it was premised on the wrong assumptions, then
they proceed with ideas on how to repair what they deem faulty policy. Gibson and
Donovan present a broad overview of maritime history since they also begin their
examination in colonial times. While their post-war study is more substantial than both

14

See K. Jack Bauer, A Maritime History of the United States: The Role of America’s Seas and
Waterways (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); and see John A. Butler, Sailing on
Friday: The Perilous Voyage of America’s Merchant Marine (Washington: Brasswy’s, 1997).

10
Bauer’s and Butler’s, they present more policy than history. 15 René de la Pedraja and
Rodney Carlisle study the industry from more narrow perspectives. De la Pedraja
provides a comprehensive study of the successes and failures of American shipping
companies in The Rise & Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping in the Twentieth Century.
He tells the story of American-flag shipping by examining the interaction of shipping
companies with each other and the destruction of American-flag shipping companies
through bad business decisions. 16 Flags of convenience and the related doctrine of
effective control are explained and analyzed by Rodney Carlisle in Sovereignty for Sale:
the Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience.
Carlisle details the origins and uses of flags of convenience, and gives insight to why
shipowners and the American government supported such enterprises and how they
affected American-flag ships. 17
Since the study of the decline of the American-flag merchant marine is such a
complex topic, this paper concentrates on the period of its greatest height through its
steady regression until today. Unlike De la Pedraja and Carlisle who study isolated parts
of the maritime industry, the decline of the American-flag merchant marine is here
examined through the interaction of the several parties which form the industry. No
solutions are presented here, only an attempt to answer the question of how the strongest
merchant fleet in the world in a short period of time declined into obscurity.

15

See Andrew Gibson and Arthur Donovan, The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States
Maritime Policy (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000).
16

17

See De la Pedraja, Rise & Decline of U.S. Merchant Shipping.

See Rodney Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale: The Origins and Evolution of the Panamanian and
Liberian Flags of Convenience (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981).
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The American maritime industry has progressed as a complex system involving
many different parties with conflicting interests. In addition to these many parties,
economics, national security, and technology also affected the condition of the industry.
The many people and aspects involved in making the maritime industry work made it
easy for the parties to blame each other when times were bad. Continuous bickering led
to long periods of stagnation in the American maritime industry. The U.S. government
hesitated to act in the hostile environment created by shipowners, shippers, shipyards,
and labor fighting to get the upper hand. Consequently, little was done in the United
States as foreign competition moved forward.
Much of the U.S. government’s merchant marine policy was grounded in
legislative acts that were established in the early twentieth century. The United States
government retained a definite policy toward maintaining a national merchant fleet since
the enactment of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
Technological advances in engine automation, more efficient cargo handling and
shipboard equipment, and the higher cost of American seamen contributed to the decline
of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet in worldwide competition. However, the major factor
causing the decline of the U.S.-flag merchant fleet was the failure of the many diverse
parties in the industry to unite in a timely manner to stop the deterioration of the
American-flag fleet. Ineffective oversight by the U.S. government of subsidy programs
combined with government inattention to changing problems in the American fleet,
including management-labor conflicts, aging ships, and stagnant maritime policy, fueled
the enmity between and among the different factions of the industry. Without
cooperation among the members of the maritime community, the merchant marine policy

12
of the United States was reduced to the rhetoric stated in the Merchant Marine Act of
1936.
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Table I – Top 20 Merchant Fleets of the World
Self-Propelled Oceangoing Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons and Greater
As of July, 1, 2004
Flag of Registry
Number of Ships
Deadweight Tons
1
Panama*
4822
187,164,000
2
Liberia*
1477
81,821,000
3
Greece
730
54,442,000
4
Bahamas*
979
43.513,000
5
Hong Kong*
733
38,844,000
6
Malta*
1172
38,798,000
7
Singapore
886
36,843,000
8
Cyprus
975
34,285,000
9
Marshall Islands*
456
33,269,000
10
China
1557
26,490,000
11
Norway (NIS)**
575
23,207,000
12
United States
412
13,035,000
13
Japan
555
11,871,000
14
India
286
11,363,000
15
Isle of Man*
246
10,604,000
16
United Kingdom
378
10,369,000
17
Italy
438
10,197,000
18
Korea (South)
530
9,861,000
19
Denmark (DIS)**
244
9,034,000
20
Iran
123
8,827,000
* Open Registries
** International Ship Registries
NIS – Norway International Shipping Registry
DIS – Denmark International Shipping Registry
Source: http://www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD_statistics/Flag-MFW-7-04.pdf; Internet:
accessed on 20 June 2006.
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Table II – Rise & Decline of the Merchant Marine 1939-2003

1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1948
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1960
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Self-Propelled Oceangoing Vessels 1,000 Gross Tons and Greater
Private and Government-owned American-Flag Ships
% of U.S.
% of U.S.
Average
Imports
Exports
Deadweight
Monthly
No. of Ships
Carried by
Carried by
Tons
Employment
AmericanAmericanof Seafarers
Flag Ships
Flag Ships
1398
11,699,000
29.6
17.1
52,445
1300
11,019,000
38.8
21.2
50,975
1168
10,096,000
N/A
N/A
50,225
N/A
N/A
63.5
38.9
47,650
N/A
N/A
79.8
53.0
76,800
N/A
N/A
78.7
61.6
125,755
N/A
N/A
79.7
61.2
158,755
4852
50,263,000
65.8
57.2
120,050
3490
36,774,000
60.1
39.1
80,250
3408
36,526,000
43.7
32.5
61,550
3386
36,336,000
42.6
37.4
84,300
3350
36,081,000
38.8
29.5
79,650
3349
36,255,000
32.3
24.1
72,750
3333
35,860,000
30.1
23.5
63,850
3235
35,017,000
26.5
19.6
57,507
2934
32,601,000
9.9
16.3
49,153
2425
28,755,000
6.1
11.1
39,100*
2275
27,182,000
N/A
N/A
51,900
2154
25,977,000
N/A
N/A
54,600
2094
25,612,000
5.8
8.0
54,200
1981
24,827,000
3.8
6.8
47,500
1780
23,280,000
5.1
6.3
37,600
1372
19,635,000
5.2
6.3
30,400
1233
18,412,000
4.5
5.8
27,700
1051
17,297,000
6.9
6.0
25,200
965
17,334,000
7.6
5.8
24,800
891
17,608,000
5.4
5.4
20,500

* Strike led to decreased number of workers

1980
1985

No. of Ships

Deadweight
Tons

863
748

23,679,000
24,439,000

% of Total
Dry Cargo
Trade Carried
by AmericanFlag Ships
4.8
5.4

% of Total
Tanker Trade
Carried by
AmericanFlag Ships
2.6
3.8

Average
Monthly
Employment
of Seafarers
19,600
13,100
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1989
1990
1991
1995
2000
2003
N/A = Not Available

No. of Ships

Deadweight
Tons

661
635
621
564
461
416

24,457,000
24,262,000
23,286,000
21,126,000
16,137,000
13,294,000

Average
Monthly
Employment
of Seafarers
9,900
11,100
11,700
7,900
6,600
N/A

Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstracts of
the United States, for years 1939-2005; and
http://www.marad.dot.gov/MARAD_statistics/US-FLAG-HISTORY.pdf; Internet:
accessed on 20 June 2006 when information was not available from Statistical Abstracts.
Note on sources: Change in statistical reporting over the years is why import/export
topics represented in the table vary.

Chapter 2: Negotiating Cooperation and Competition: Britain,
the U.S., and Merchant Shipping, 1940-1948
During World War II, the United States and Great Britain engaged in what
scholars refer to as the “Special Relationship.” 18 Even though the United States was
technically neutral at the start of the war in Europe, the U.S. gave invaluable assistance to
the British war effort. Britain realized early in the war that it needed American assistance
to win. Yet, the U.S. and Britain, as they joined together in war, also continued to
compete economically. The exigencies of war forced Britain to agree with American
policies that conflicted with British strategy, but even as the bombs were exploding
during the Battle of Britain, the British continued negotiations for wartime goods with
their economic future clearly in mind. However, the pressures of war forced Britain to
compromise with U.S. policies to receive the necessary support to survive. The
Americans were gaining a superior bargaining position, but Britain achieved muchneeded help from their “neutral” friend.
Britain faced a logistical problem in the early stages of World War II that it did
not anticipate: Britain did not possess sufficient merchant shipping tonnage to fulfill its
wartime needs. The importance of shipping tonnage became readily apparent once
Britain experienced the debilitating effects of not having enough ships. The British
turned to the Americans for help. With the advent of the Lend-Lease agreements and the
entry of the United States into the hostilities after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. began the largest

18

David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1841: A Study in
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Press, Inc., 1988).
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shipbuilding effort the nation ever saw. The mass production of Liberty ships and T-2
tankers returned the necessary shipping strength to the Allies.
As the Allies neared victory, economic concerns began to dominate AngloAmerican negotiations. The British expected American assistance to stabilize the
European economy. The United States likewise recognized that the only way to maintain
a strong Western Europe was for the region to have a strong economy. Since the Soviet
Union also emerged from World War II as a superpower, the United States and Britain
faced a new threat to national security – the spread of Communism. The world was
anxious about Soviet intentions, and the ensuing Cold War led to new economic and
national security trepidation. The Marshall Plan attempted to address these concerns.
The United States realized that leaving Europe to rebuild itself without American
aid, could once again lead to conflict. With the Soviet Union seeking to gain strength by
expanding Communism, the United States offered Western Europe monetary assistance
to rebuild. Through the Marshall Plan, America reached out to Western Europe in an
effort to keep an open market for free trade. 19
The U.S. built thousands of ships during World War II, and when the war ended,
it possessed the majority of the world’s shipping tonnage. In order to assist the other
Allies in rebuilding their merchant fleets, the U.S. sold many of its wartime ships at
discount prices to the traditional maritime nations of Western Europe. 20 Although the
merchant marine proved critical to Allied victory, the importance of maintaining a
national fleet of merchant ships would soon be overshadowed by economic and trade
considerations.
19
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In the post-war world, the U.S. and Britain continued to compete economically.
If market gain coincided with a lapse of some of the more remote security concerns, the
United States was willing to let that happen. The merchant marine was one of these
concerns. In pursuit of safe and livable ships, the U.S. developed a system of regulation
and seamen’s rights that caused American-flag ships to be more expensive to operate
than any in the world. In order to reduce shipping costs and thus reduce the overall cost
of trade, United States shipowners began to seek less expensive ways to compete in
world trade. Instead of attempting to match European prices and operate on an equal
trade footing, American interests sought ways to undercut the British and other shippers
by turning to flags of convenience. 21
Panamanian ship registry afforded fewer regulations and lower taxes along with
the choice of people of any nationality to man the ships. With many nations being freed
from imperial rule, several poor countries offered workers who did not have the luxury of
a bargaining position. They were people seeking to survive and were willing to accept
low pay and poor conditions afforded on board the Panamanian ships. In 1948, U.S.
business interests formed the Liberian ship registry to offer yet another way to
circumvent the higher costs of American ships. The Liberian registry was in effect
formed by oil companies and subsequently patronized by many American oil interests. 22
Several businessmen who held influential U.S. government positions were
instrumental in the growth of the Panamanian and Liberian ship registries. W. Averell
Harriman and Edward R. Stettinius both actively supported the use of these open
21
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registries. Even though the American-flag merchant marine proved to be indispensable
during World War II, the close tie between the U.S. government and American business
in the drive toward economic hegemony allowed flags of convenience to prosper.

Cautious Partners: Britain and America during the War
Throughout the war, the United States and Great Britain remained economic
competitors. As America assisted the British war effort before Pearl Harbor, the
economic power struggle continued. The Destroyers for Bases deal allowed the U.S. to
gain strength in its relationship with Britain. While this would benefit the U.S. in future
economic trade, the Roosevelt administration knew that it was not in the best interest of
its own economy to bankrupt Britain. Since American isolationist factions were powerful
at the start of the war, the Lend-Lease program was devised to give the needed assistance
without declaring war. Among Britain’s weaknesses was its lack of sufficient merchant
shipping capacity to supply its troops and citizens at home and throughout the British
Empire. The United States then began the most extensive shipbuilding program in its
history, and through Lend-Lease and the use of American-flag ships, solved Britain’s
supply problems. However, while grateful that they were receiving needed resources, the
British were concerned about the effect that an abundance of shipping tonnage flying the
American-flag would have on future trade.
The extensive personal correspondence of Winston Churchill and Franklin D.
Roosevelt throughout the war effort best illustrates the emerging relationship between the
United States and Great Britain. This correspondence began while Churchill was First
Lord of the Admiralty and ended with Roosevelt’s death almost six years later. Once
Churchill became Prime Minister, British pleas to Roosevelt for American assistance
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began. Churchill wrote to Roosevelt several times to stress the urgency of Britain’s
needs. With France on the brink of collapse, Britain would be unable to fight the Nazis
without help from the United States. 23
Because Britain lacked destroyers to protect its coasts and shipping convoys, the
British begged the United States for some of its old destroyers. On May 15, 1940,
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt asking the United States for, among other things, the loan of
“forty or fifty of your older destroyers.” 24 The United States offered to trade destroyers
for strategic military bases on British possessions in the Caribbean and Canada.
Possession of these bases would give the United States a foothold in an area previously
denied it by Britain. 25
The Destroyers for Bases deal resulted only after a lengthy negotiation between
the United States and Great Britain. Britain did not wish to link a trade of navy
destroyers to United States use of British colonial lands in the Western Hemisphere. The
British desired an exchange of gifts, not a contractual quid pro quo. The United States
did not view the deal as such and wanted definite terms laid out for giving the destroyers
to Britain. As Britain’s position in the war became more untenable, Roosevelt wanted
assurances that if he gave them the destroyers, in the event that the British could not hold
out, the British navy would not be surrendered. Roosevelt offered that the fleet be taken

23

Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill & Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, I. Alliance
Emerging, October 1933 – November 1942 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 44-52,
(Churchill to Roosevelt, June 12, 1940; Churchill to Roosevelt, June 13, 1940; Roosevelt to Churchill, June
13, 1940; Churchill to Roosevelt, June 14, 1940; Roosevelt to Churchill, June 14, 1940; Churchill to
Roosevelt, June 15, 1940).
24

25

Kimball, Churchill & Roosevelt, 37-38, (Churchill to Roosevelt, May 15, 1940).

Charlie Whitham, Bitter Rehearsal: British and American Planning for a Post-War West Indies
(Westport:Praeger, 2002), 20.

21
to the U.S. in this event so that it would be protected from German capture. The British
became suspicious and viewed this proposition as the United States not wanting to give
the help needed to save Britain, but that “America was waiting on the sidelines to pick up
the pieces.” 26 Britain’s responses to Roosevelt’s concerns over the British fleet falling
into the hands of Germany impressed upon the United States that it must provide the
necessary assistance to Britain before such an event happened or the security of the
Western Hemisphere would be threatened whether or not the British fleet was lost. 27
Since an economic agenda seemed to exist in all Anglo-American dealings, it
follows that there would also be economic considerations embedded in what became
known as the Destroyers for Bases deal. In correspondence between the United States
and Britain, the U.S. muted its economic aims. 28 But even without declaring an explicit
economic agenda, the United States made clear who controlled the new Anglo-American
alliance. This would become evident in subsequent economic dealings between the two
nations.
The deal was finalized in March 1941. 29 Britain did not achieve American
entrance into the war, but giving a belligerent nation navy war ships could hardly be
considered a neutral act. Britain may have lost some of its bargaining power to the
Americans, but it achieved a major step toward gaining American help for the Allies.
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Now that United States aid was forthcoming, Churchill kept Roosevelt abreast of
British war needs. In a letter to Roosevelt on November 12, 1940, Churchill explained
what Britain would need in 1941. Among his requests, Churchill asked Roosevelt for
surplus merchant tonnage for Britain to purchase. 30 Submarine warfare and the Battle of
Britain created a vacuum in available shipping tonnage for which the British shipbuilding
industry was unprepared.
Prior to the beginning of hostilities in Europe on September 1, 1939, the British
analyzed the amount of merchant shipping tonnage they would require in order to fight a
war with Germany. 31 They did not estimate all of the factors that could affect their
shipping capabilities during the course of the conflict. In addition to actual shipping
tonnage, port availability and voyage route availability were crucial to determine what
would be required to supply Britain and the Empire. Once the Axis effectively shut down
through traffic in the Mediterranean, the voyage from Britain to its South Asian and
African colonies was considerably lengthened. Also, given the German U-boat threat in
the English Channel and its ability to bomb Britain’s Southern and Eastern ports, British
port availability was diminished. 32 As shipping losses to German submarines in the
Battle of the Atlantic mounted, Britain was forced to compensate for its inadequate prewar plans.
The British shipbuilding industry was unprepared to produce the amount of
tonnage necessary to keep up with the needs of longer voyages and shipping losses.
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British labor and facilities hindered its progress. Workers who lost jobs when war
production ended after World War I were reluctant to let that happen again. Thus there
were not as many shipyard workers hired as needed in labor’s attempt to prevent large
layoffs after the war. British shipyards were also not up to modern standards and
shipbuilding executives did not want to change their ways. 33
The lack of ships put a tremendous strain on British resources. They could not
maintain an adequate supply of food and consumer goods in addition to supplying their
troops with war materials. Britain turned to U.S. merchant ships. With Britain running
out of hard currency, the U.S. established the Lend-Lease program, which sparked the
greatest shipbuilding effort in American history. 34
In December 1940, Churchill again expressed his desire for more shipping
tonnage. 35 Roosevelt responded in a fireside chat to the American people on December
29, 1940 when he argued that the United States must give all aid possible to Britain to
contain the Nazis in Europe: “We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is
an emergency as serious as war itself.” 36 Roosevelt realized that in order to stand against
the Germans, Britain needed the assistance of the United States on terms other than cash
33
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payment. 37 This preceded passage of the Lend-Lease Act, which provided a means for
the United States to become the “arsenal of democracy” without bankrupting Britain.
The Lend-Lease program demonstrated that even during a time of close
friendship, the United States and Britain remained economic competitors. Roosevelt’s
fireside chat of December 29 committed the United States to increase production to aid
the British. While Churchill was initially grateful and relieved that the United States
passed the Lend-Lease Act, he remained wary of the economic consequences of receiving
goods on American terms. 38 The negotiations between the United States and Britain over
the Lend-Lease Agreement were prolonged because Article VII granted freer trade than
the British were willing to concede. 39 Britain viewed Article VII as demanding that
Britain give up its policy of imperial preference in exchange for Lend-Lease goods.
After assurances from Roosevelt to Churchill that this was not the case, even though
Roosevelt expected economic talks to continue, the preliminary Lend-Lease agreement
was signed on February 23, 1942. 40
The British sent Sir Arthur Salter, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Ministry
of Shipping, to Washington to oversee American aid to the British Merchant Shipping
Mission. 41 With more goods available for British use, a way to transport these goods to
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Britain and its troops was needed. The Liberty ship program applied mass production
techniques to the shipyards of the United States. These ships were built quickly to meet
the wartime demand and to overpower the Axis with sheer numbers. The Liberty ship
program combined with advances made in submarine detection and code-breaking and
led to Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Toward the end of the war, however, this excess of shipping in American hands
worried the British, and thoughts of post-war trade competition began to resurface. The
Allied nations who led the world in shipping before the war looked to the United States to
return them to their pre-war numbers. In 1943, after the Allies won the Battle of the
Atlantic, shipping tonnage was abundant. Now that sufficient tonnage was readily
available for all of the Allied needs, Lord Salter remarked that “[t]he whole situation had
been so transformed that I found the Commons apparently more concerned with future
competition with America than with shipping difficulties in the war (which was after all
to last two years more.)” 42
Thus, when the Americans
showed a desire to build merchant
ships that would be more useful
commercially than the Liberties, the
British kept a close eye on American
shipbuilding practices. The Liberty

Figure 1

ship (See Figure 1) was easily adapted to the principles of mass production, but was a
relatively slow ship at 11 knots. As the program progressed, the Maritime Commission
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developed plans for the similar, but faster Victory ship with a speed of 16.5 knots. 43 The
Liberty ship could be built in greater volumes for wartime needs, but the Victory ship
(See Figure 2) would be more useful in a commercial setting after the war.
Consequently, when the U.S. began leaning toward Victory ship construction, the British
pushed for more Liberty ships to be built. 44

Planning for the Post-War World
Once Allied victory was imminent, the
U.S. and Britain looked closer at the structure
of the new world economic order. At Bretton
Woods and Quebec in 1944, Roosevelt and

Figure 2

Churchill discussed the rebuilding of Western Europe and the world economy. The
Soviets set out on a path of their own after the war, and the threat of Soviet expansion
revealed the need for a strong Western European economy. Since American money was
needed for this endeavor, the U.S. offered the Marshall Plan to help European nations
that rejected Soviet communism rebuild. In addition, an international forum met in the
U.S. to organize a world body to prevent another world war from destroying these hardwon arrangements. The massive amount of shipping tonnage now in American hands
provided an essential element to rebuild Europe and stabilize world trade. The merchant
fleets of the European maritime countries had been devastated by the war, and America
was left with the largest merchant fleet in the world. Many of these countries expected
the United States to hand out their surplus ship tonnage to return the ratios closer to those
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of pre-war times.
The United States and Britain, at conferences at Bretton Woods and Quebec in
1944, took major steps in determining the structure of post-war economic trade. The
Bretton Woods conference established monetary exchange stability among western
nations. An International Monetary Fund and an International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development were set up to promote a strong global economy and provide for the
reconstruction of Western Europe. American isolationism and British imperial
hegemony were left behind as the dollar became the world’s leading currency, surpassing
the British sterling. 45
After Bretton Woods, Roosevelt and Churchill met again at Quebec to decide on a
number of remaining issues. They agreed that mutual Lend-Lease assistance would
continue after the defeat of Germany during the war against Japan. 46 Britain also
received a favorable position in the division of Germany and was given the industrialized
section of Germany to administer after the war. It further received trade routes once
dominated by Germany. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau felt that this would
aid British financial recovery. 47 This was one of the first steps in moving toward a stable
Britain for the post-war period.
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As Western European nations embarked on their post-war recovery plans, the
emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union was changing the concepts of traditional
national security. The objective of the Marshall Plan was to unite the nations of Europe
in a free trade environment thus providing a united and stable economy. The United
States decided to provide aid to Europe to prevent economic insecurity from producing a
domino effect that would destroy free trade. Since the European economy was linked to
trade in many parts of the world where the United States also traded, the end of free trade
in Europe would mean an end to free trade throughout the world. 48 The United Nations
and the Marshall Plan were both efforts to provide for economic and national security in
Western Europe and the world.
To further both the economic objectives and to provide an international forum for
the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations, the United Nations was formed. A
conference was convened in San Francisco near the end of the war in April 1945 to
organize nations to prevent yet another world war. The economic aspects of world peace
were reflected in Chapters 9 and 10 in the Charter of the United Nations. In his report to
President Harry Truman on the conference, Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State,
emphasized that, in order to maintain a strong American economy, the markets of the
world must be healthy. 49
Ideas expressed at Bretton Woods, Quebec, and in the United Nations were
simply words without American shipping tonnage. Europe needed time to recover from
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the war, and with the Marshall Plan in place, shipping would provide the means to build a
stable world economy.
It would take time for the shipbuilding industry throughout Europe to replenish
the European merchant fleets. Western Europe looked to the large American fleet as an
interim solution for its shipping needs. One steamship company chairman in Britain
suggested that the recovery of the British merchant marine should be accomplished by
war reparations and for “[t]he American government to hand over such vessels built,
under construction or arranged for, under their flag, to their Allies as necessary to bring
up the proportion of shipping owned by them at the outbreak of hostilities.” 50
This assertion may have been the result of wartime agreements between the
United States and Great Britain concerning the best way to meet wartime needs. Since
American troops and war materials were moving from the U.S. to Britain, Roosevelt and
Churchill agreed that merchant ships would be built principally in America. A portion of
the completed ships would then be transferred to the British flag for temporary wartime
duty so that the pool of experienced British seamen would not go to waste. 51 The United
States answered the post-war European call for ships by offering surplus wartime tonnage
for sale under the Merchant Ships Sales Act of 1946. A merchant fleet, thus, for both the
U.S. and Europe, was essential to the new world order.
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Flags of Convenience: Competition on the Sea under the New World
Order
While helping the countries of Western Europe along the path of economic
recovery, the United States was taking the lead in world economic affairs. At Bretton
Woods, the United States introduced the world to an economic system that would be
dependent on the dollar. The Marshall Plan also put the U.S. in the forefront of Western
European economic recovery. World War II had enabled the U.S. to assume the role of
unquestioned leader in world affairs. After World War II, the United States led the world
in shipping tonnage, followed by Great Britain. Thus, Anglo-American competition
continued into the post-war period. To maintain United States supremacy, American
shipowners saw the need to cut their costs to make American trade more competitive in
an international setting.
During the war, American merchant seamen who manned U.S.-flag ships in the
Battle of the Atlantic and elsewhere, agreed to a no-strike policy and accepted the War
Labor Board’s regulations setting wages. After the war, seamen returned to collective
bargaining under their union agreements. 52
Shipowners turned then to a new way of controlling wages, that of flags of
convenience. 53 Also referred to as open registries, flags of convenience included ships
that, for the most part, had no connection with the flag state other than possibly a dummy
corporation formed solely for the purpose of registering a ship. There were generally no
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citizenship requirements for an owner to register a ship under that flag. Flag of
convenience ships were typically manned by seamen from poor countries who had little
or no bargaining power and therefore at times were not provided with sanitary living
conditions and were paid at the whim of the owners. Flag of convenience ships allowed
non-union labor, tax incentives, and relaxed safety regulations, all to lower operating
costs for shipowners.
Flags of convenience provided a way to reduce American shipping costs to a level
below what the Western European nations could offer on board their ships. The United
States began its flag of convenience practices through the use of the Panamanian flag,
and later created a flag of convenience registry in Liberia which offered less hassle than
the Panamanian registry.
Flags of convenience had been used throughout the twentieth century for various
reasons. The most popular rationalization in the early years of the century was to avoid
the negative effects of neutrality laws during wartime. Many shipowners used the flags
of other countries to avoid their own countries’ neutrality laws so they would not lose
money by being denied access to certain trade routes. Yet in the end, the core purpose of
the flag of convenience registries was to circumvent the laws of the owner’s home nation
to achieve higher profits. 54
The Panamanian flag of convenience had a long history of being used for a
number of purposes. After the Volstead Act went into effect in 1920, alcoholic drinks
could no longer be served on board American-flag ships. This was particularly
devastating to the cruise ship industry. One American shipowner, W. Averell Harriman,
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who later entered politics, owned several American-flag ships, including two passenger
liners, the Reliance and the Resolute. In 1922, he transferred the ships to the Panamanian
flag in order to avoid the restrictions of Prohibition that the Attorney General extended to
American-flag ships. Harriman preferred the Panamanian registry because of the close
relationship between the United States and Panama after the opening of the Panama
Canal in 1914. This not only allowed the American-owned cruise ships to better compete
with foreign ships in offering similar amenities to passengers, but it also revealed to
American businessmen other advantages. Customs duties and higher crew costs could be
avoided by patronizing the Panamanian flag. 55
Panamanian registry was again used by U.S. shipowners on the eve of World War
II to bypass the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s that forbade U.S.-flag ships from entering
war zones. As World War II ended, the Panamanian registry became more complicated
and thus less convenient. Some American oil corporation interests through the late 1940s
were flagging their ships in Panama, but the situation in Panama turned bad in 1947 when
a wave of anti-American feelings culminated in a week of rioting in Panama City. This,
in addition to contemporary political changes in Panama, upset the purpose for which
owners flocked to a flag of convenience. 56
Edward Stettinius, who served as Secretary of State under Roosevelt and Truman,
and several of his oil industry associates, created an opportunity in Liberia that several oil
tanker owners embraced. While Secretary of State in 1945, Stettinius traveled to Liberia
after the conference at Yalta to celebrate the opening of the Port of Monrovia. As a
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former chairman of the board at U.S. Steel, however, he noted that the country was rich
with natural resources. The Liberian ship registry grew out of the efforts of Stettinius
Associates, a corporation formed by Stettinius in 1947 to create “a system of privately
directed economic aid to Liberia.” 57 With the encouragement of American oil interests,
the Liberian ship registry resulted from collaboration between Stettinius Associates and
the Liberian government. Also, the United States government actively supported the
formation of the Liberian ship registry. The State Department conducted a review of its
provisions before it was adopted and suggested several changes to the code. The
Liberian ship registry was basically operated out of the United States with a percentage of
the fees collected going to the Liberian government. 58
American oil interests also helped form the rules of the new Liberian registry.
Standard Oil Company executives, for example, reviewed the registry law prior to its
adoption. 59 Liberia now offered a haven for shipowners, approved by the American
government and operated almost exclusively by Americans, to reduce their operating
costs, and ultimately to offer better trade incentives than the Europeans.
To address national security concerns amid growing Cold War tensions related to
the decrease the Liberian registry would cause in U.S. registry, the American government
adopted the doctrine of “effective control of shipping.” This principle provided that in
time of war, flag of convenience ships that were owned by American interests would be
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under the effective control of the United States. 60 This would enable the United States
government to requisition these ships in time of need for use in a war effort. The
reliability of a program that depended on foreign citizens to support U.S. foreign policy
was questioned by some members of Congress. During the Vietnam War several foreign
crews refused to take ships carrying American supplies into the war zone. Senator
Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce in 1967, testified
at a hearing concerning the condition of the American merchant marine that “I do not
think you can use the words ‘effective control’ on a ship built with American money in
an English yard flying a Liberian flag chartered by a Greek corporation with Italian
officers and an Indian crew in the Straits of Suez… And there are many examples of
that.” 61 He presented a specific instance when a Mexican crew refused to sail a ship with
American war supplies because it violated Mexican neutrality laws. When that cargo was
transferred to a Greek ship, part of that crew refused to sail because of political reasons.
Thus, a cargo bound for American troops in Vietnam was delayed for over two weeks. 62
Also at that hearing, Alfred Maskin, representing the American Maritime
Association, an organization of shipping companies operating unsubsidized Americanflag vessels, summed up the doctrine when he declared, “how much effective control we
exercise over a ship depends in a great measure on who mans the ship….”63
Nevertheless, at the time of the formation of the Liberian registry, effective control
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dictated how national security interests would be met after the Liberian flag of
convenience drew ships away from the American-flag fleet. This doctrine is still used
today to defend the usefulness of flags of convenience even though there were several
instances similar to those in Vietnam that occurred during the Persian Gulf War in the
early 1990s. 64

The Effect of International Competition
America and Great Britain have been economic competitors since before there
was a United States. Even through the turmoil of the Second World War, Britain fought
to keep its world economic position as the United States strived for hegemony.
Economics and national security ran hand in hand. Even though circumstances at times
raised doubts about the very future of Britain, Churchill never allowed the complete
sacrifice of British economic policy in order to obtain help in fighting the Germans.
Furthermore, when faced with the danger that a loss of Britain would pose to the Western
Hemisphere, the United States in effect gave massive amounts of materials to the Allies
without monetary compensation.
Although economics is seldom forgotten during times of war, proven national
security entities have been allowed to lapse in times of peace. The American-flag
merchant marine was instrumental in defeat of the Axis powers, but when the violence of
the war ceased, cheaper alternatives to the U.S. merchant fleet were immediately sought.
American business interests and U.S. government policy were united in purpose by
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individuals like Harriman and Stettinius who played important roles in both government
and business.
Since the Liberian and Panamanian ship registries offered American owners a less
expensive method of promoting overseas trade, the future of the United States-flag
merchant marine did not look bright. The British-flag fleet faced similar challenges.
With the American ability to undercut British shipping costs by using less expensive
ships, it would be only a matter of time before Britain would also have to turn to flag of
convenience shipping in order to compete.
The lessons of World War II were short lived where merchant shipping tonnage
was concerned. Even though both the United States and Great Britain had just
experienced the importance of merchant shipping to maintain national security, post-war
economic concerns took precedence. In the emerging world of economic dominance, the
top two nations in world shipping elevated economics above national security. Economic
competition began to lead the world firmly on a path that would change the face of
merchant shipping.
With the cessation of hostilities and the economic recovery of Western Europe
underway, wartime ships entered commercial operations. Technology that was
introduced during the war was improved and advanced to create more efficient and better
ships. Western European nations and the Soviet Union began building up their national
fleets, while the flag of convenience registries continued to grow. The U.S. government
focus turned to peacetime economic growth, but rather than pursuing its policy of
maintaining a strong merchant marine, it openly supported and allowed shipowners to
migrate to flags of convenience.
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As the shipowners, shipyards, shippers, and maritime labor all adjusted to the new
world order and the rising American economy, the parties began to pursue their
individual interests. When the U.S. government attempted to support each group
separately, animosity between the parties grew. As the maritime factions quarreled,
progress in the industry stopped.

Chapter 3: Policy, Labor, and Technology: The Beginning of
the Downward Spiral, 1946-1984
The United States-flag merchant marine faced new challenges after the war. The
Liberian ship registry was in full operation and offered economic advantages to
shipowners. The American labor force was bargaining for better wages and working
conditions, and unions were again becoming a strong factor in the industry. Researchers
devised technological innovations that saved money and made work more efficient while
lowering the number of general laborers needed in the work force. Finally, the new
leader of the free world began a campaign seeking world economic leadership, industrial
and trade regulation, and maintenance of security during the emerging Cold War.
Shipowners attempted to bypass the stricter regulations, taxes, and crew
requirements of the U.S. flag by registering their ships under flags of convenience to an
extent unprecedented to that time. Using the new Liberian ship registry instituted by
Stettinius and others after the war, many American shipowners sought to lower their
operating costs and increase profits. Some of the ships transferred to flag of convenience
registries were from the surplus of Liberty ships and T-2 tankers left over from the World
War II shipbuilding bonanza. 65
Because the United States possessed too much shipping tonnage for American
business to absorb, in 1946, Congress passed the Merchant Ship Sales Act to enable the
United States government to sell its surplus wartime shipping tonnage. In addition to
providing rules for the transfer of war-built ships from government operation to
American private corporate control, the Sales Act allowed foreign citizens, particularly
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those of the Allied nations of World War II, to acquire U.S. war-built ships that were in
excess of what U.S. businesses could effectively operate. The authority of the
government to sell and charter vessels under the Sales Act ended on December 31,
1947. 66 This date was extended several times in order to distribute the extra ships, and
this act has also been amended numerous times over the years.
One section of the Sales Act remains untouched to this day: the “Declaration of
Policy.” 67 This policy concentrated on maintaining an American-flag merchant marine
for both economic growth and national security interests. Nevertheless, even with the
continued emphasis on preserving a viable merchant fleet under the U.S. flag, Congress
never restricted American business in its use of open registries. In fact, through its
support of the Panamanian and Liberian registries, the American government encouraged
their continued use and thus the shrinking of the nation’s merchant fleet.
The turn to open registries contributed also to labor unrest during the 1950s and
1960s. Maritime labor leaders saw shipboard jobs passing to the seamen of third world
countries who were willing to work under reduced safety and living conditions for much
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less money than an American seaman could survive on living in the United States. 68 In
addition to the competition imposed from foreign seamen, American seamen faced a
reduction caused by technological innovation in the maritime industry. Possibilities of
new methods of propulsion, automated engine rooms, and more efficient cargo handling
and stowage techniques threatened to substantially cut the shipboard labor force.
Malcolm McLean’s new containers were instrumental in changing cargo handling and
ship design.
Congress held many hearings regarding labor-management problems, subsidy
control, shipbuilding in American shipyards, and overall more efficient means of
competing in the international shipping market. This effort to determine problems and
solutions to the ever-dwindling American-flag fleet led to amendments and alteration of
existing merchant marine legislation. From the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 through
the 1980s, all the discussion about problems in the industry led not to a solution, but only
to further discussion. The U.S. government had the ability to oversee all groups in the
maritime industry. In its new position as world leader, through foreign policy, industry
regulation, and government aid, the national government was the major player in
determining whether the U.S. flag would survive in international trade.
Without government guidance and regulation, the diverse parties in the maritime
industry were left to fend for themselves. Pleasing various political constituencies has
long been a concern of American politicians. The controversy surrounding the
perceptions of different interest groups in the need for a viable American-flag merchant
fleet and the method in which to attain it resulted in harmful delays in either updating
68

Joseph P. Goldberg, The Maritime Story: A Study in Labor-Management Relations (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1958), 229-231.

41
standing maritime policy or in developing methods in which to achieve the goals of the
current policy. The American-flag merchant marine was inundated with wartime ships
built quickly with defective technology and low-quality steel. Labor faced work force
reduction from new technologies and from flags of convenience. Shipowners struggled
against lower-cost foreign competition. The lack of government guidance and regulation
during this turbulent time encouraged internal bickering between the different factions of
the maritime industry. The government’s failure to support an American merchant fleet
and effectively regulate the diverse parties and interests of the maritime industry initiated
the decline of the U.S.-flag merchant marine.

Unions, U.S. Policy, and the Post-War World Maritime Order
The main conflicting interests within the maritime industry pitted shipowners and
shippers seeking to reduce costs against labor unions fighting for higher wages and good
working conditions. To complicate matters, different interests within each faction did not
always pursue the same goals. Shipowners clashed over trade routes; shippers looked for
low costs, but also for safe transit of their goods; and labor unions did not always agree
on how to best represent their members. When the focus in shipping returned to the
commercial market after the war, a prudent congressman could not summarily dismiss
any one of these interests without considering how that would affect his chances for
future election. Hence, Congress hesitated to take definitive action in the maritime
industry. Instead of regulating the actions of these diverse parties in the interest of
maintaining a national merchant fleet, Congress concentrated on providing subsidies to
satisfy some shipowners and labor while it allowed other shipowners to transfer their
ships to flags of convenience.
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Seamen after World War II began once again to engage in collective bargaining
with their employers. 69 Considering the size of the American fleet at this time, with the
rebuilding of the European economies and security of the free world in addition to the
rising tension in Korea, American merchant seamen were in demand. Yet seamen, who
had received bonuses and other extras during the war, suddenly returned to their base
wages. The need for seamen gave the unions the power to demand increases in basic
wage rates at least to be in line with the rising standard of living in the United States. 70
During the early post-war years, several seamen’s and officers’ unions
represented American labor on board ship. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, the old
communist factions within the seamen’s unions were becoming unpopular. Even so,
from his leadership position in the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen’s
Union (ILWU), Harry Bridges had great influence on maritime labor, especially on the
west coast. His agreement with many policies and ideals that were labeled “communist”
caused friction with other labor leaders in the industry, notably Harry Lundeberg of the
Sailors’ Union of the Pacific (SUP) and the Seafarers’ International Union (SIU). All
seamen’s unions progressively became more interested in gaining rights for their
membership than in embracing political ideology. 71 This general agreement on not
taking specific political stands, however, did not lead the different unions to merge into
one at this time. Several concerns of the individual unions still differed and caused
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animosity within the maritime environment. This was compounded on some ships when
several unions made up a crew.
The NS Savannah, America’s first nuclear-powered merchant ship, demonstrated
the problem of too many unions in one crew. Members from five different maritime
unions were employed on board the Savannah during States Marine Lines’ operation of
the vessel. The four unions that spoke for the ship’s officers were the International
Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots (MMP) representing the licensed deck
officers; the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (MEBA) speaking for the licensed
engineering officers; the American Radio Association (ARA) acting for the licensed
radio officers; and the Staff Officers’ Association (SOA) covering the pursers. The
unlicensed members of the crew were supported by the National Maritime Union
(NMU). 72 Animosity arose from the very beginning between the several unions and
States Marine Lines, and also between the different unions and their representative
members.
The most outspoken union on board the Savannah was the MEBA. MEBA
bargained with States Marine Lines mainly through Jesse Calhoon, who was secretarytreasurer at the beginning of the negotiations until he became president of the union in
1963. The engineers were concerned about many items including wages during the
training phase of their employment, shipboard accommodations, manning scales, and a
number of smaller items they were not happy with. There was no collective bargaining
agreement between States Marine Lines when the engineers finally boarded the ship after
training, and consequently they refused to sail. MEBA arranged a temporary agreement
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with the operating company, and the ship conducted sea trials in March and April of
1962. When the Maritime Administration turned the ship over to States Marine Lines on
May 1, 1962, the parties had still not settled on a final labor agreement. The engineers
again refused to sail the ship. 73
As negotiations with MEBA progressed, the other unions became suspicious of
MEBA’s intentions, and they wanted their due compensation too. This disagreement
culminated in a complicated arbitration proceeding followed by a challenge of the
arbitration award in the New York Supreme Court. The New York courts upheld the
arbitration award in early 1963. On February 12, 1963, the Savannah docked in
Galveston, Texas, which was to be its home port. 74
Repairs were planned for the stay in Galveston, and then in May the Savannah
was scheduled to make a trip to thirty five countries around the world. As departure time
for the world voyage approached, the engineers were still not happy with the arbitration
award. When they refused to sail the ship in May, States Marine Lines tried to solve the
dispute, but a compromise was not forthcoming between the several unions. The
Maritime Administration dismissed States Marine Lines and put the operator contract up
for bid. 75 In July 1963, American Export Isbrandtsen Lines and its contracted unions
entered into a “no-strike” agreement with the Maritime Administration. After the new
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personnel were trained, the Savannah went on its mission without further problem or
delay. 76
Attempts at automation on board conventionally-powered ships also caused labor
unrest. 77 Automated ships meant fewer jobs for shipboard personnel. With the American
merchant fleet in decline and the vast number of its ships aging past their useful lives,
union leaders would have been remiss in their duties to allow reduced manning scales
without a fight. In Congressional hearings held in 1966 by the House Merchant Marine
and Fisheries Committee, William B. Rand, president of United States Lines, a U.S.-flag
liner shipping company, empathized with labor in its attempt to stop the reduction of
manning on automated vessels. He stated that union reluctance to reduced manning
resulted from the fact that “[t]he unions see absolutely no future whatsoever and … if we
could have something to shoot at, a goal of an increased American merchant marine, we
could obtain all sorts of cooperation from the unions in the reduction of crews.” 78
Despite the many union disagreements, the unions concurred in other areas,
particularly concerning the increasing use of flag of convenience shipping. As the
Liberian ship registry grew with ships owned by American interests, the seamen’s unions
not only fought back, but also were joined by the European nations that had strong
maritime traditions. American seamen and European governments argued “that flags of
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convenience were unethical legal fictions designed to escape the safety controls, social
legislation, taxation, and maritime policies required by other nations.” 79
Although the American seamen and the Europeans were driving toward the same
goal, they approached the matter from different sides. The European argument stemmed
from the international competition during the war. U.S. and British competition for
economic and trade superiority continued after the war with most of the European
maritime nations siding with Britain on matters of ship registry. Europe viewed the use
of flags of convenience by American shipowners as a method of unfair competition. The
European nations sought a way to force ships to be registered in the country of the owner
or in a country customarily associated with maritime activities. 80
Europeans stressed their opposition to flags of convenience at the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958. Conflict arose over how the
nationality of a ship should be determined under international law. The controversial
statement was “for purposes of recognition of the national character of the ship by other
states, there must exist a genuine link between the state and the ship.” 81 The nations
involved on both sides knew that the “genuine link” part of this phrase was ambiguous
enough that it wouldn’t cause a problem to either side. However, the flag of convenience
supporters, mainly Liberia, Panama, and the United States, were against including the
“recognition of the national character of the ship” part of the statement. 82 The United
States suggested that instead of associating a “genuine link” with the “recognition of the
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national character of the ship,” it would be better to require the flag state to “exercise
control and effective jurisdiction” over vessels under its registry. 83 Since this phrase in
effect turned out to be as vague as the “genuine link” concept, the character of flag of
convenience registries was not substantially altered, and the practice of open registry
continued. 84
In their fight against flags of convenience, American seamen turned to the forces
of domestic and international labor and to the American courts. Joining with the
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), an international organization that
looked after the rights of workers in the transportation industry, the American maritime
unions fought to nullify the advantages of the flag of convenience registries by requiring
labor on board ships to be organized by unions from the nation of the shipowner, not of
the flag state.
Through a system of boycotts and organizing efforts, the unions from 1958
through 1962 disrupted flag of convenience operations. 85 American seamen’s unions
brought the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) into their fight to organize foreign
seamen under their unions. The NLRB applied a test where, if the ship and its owners
had sufficient contact with the United States, the NLRB would have jurisdiction over
labor matters on board those ships instead of the flag state. This would make American
labor law apply on board American-owned flag of convenience ships, and the unions
would be free to conduct their organizing efforts on board those vessels. This looked like
a union victory over open registries, but the United States Supreme Court stepped in and
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ruled that this was not so. Even though it was not obligated by the facts of the specific
case before it to rule as definitively as it did, the Supreme Court effectively cleared up the
entire issue of the applicable labor law on board flag of convenience vessels. The
Supreme Court “concluded that the jurisdictional provisions of the [National Labor
Relations] Act do not extend to maritime operations of foreign-flag ships employing alien
seamen.” 86 Congress in effect signaled its agreement with this ruling by not legislating
otherwise. Therefore, the Supreme Court decision formed the applicable law. 87
It is not surprising that the U.S. Congress did not act on this issue. There were
several conflicting sides in this dilemma that would have trapped many congressmen in
politically disadvantageous positions. With the European governments and the seamen’s
unions fighting to restrict flag of convenience registries and the shipowners claiming that
they could not survive economically under the American flag, the United States
government agreed with business that transfer of ships to these open registries should not
be burdened with limitations. After all, it was W. Averell Harriman, who served as a
government official under several U.S. presidents, including Secretary of Commerce
under President Harry Truman, who re-flagged his ships in Panama in the 1920s to avoid
the Prohibition laws. And it was Edward R. Stettinius, Secretary of State under
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, who developed the Liberian ship registry. 88
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The U.S.-Flag Merchant Marine and Changing Technology
As the battle over flag of convenience registries was raging, the maritime industry
adjusted to changing technology. Companies were developing new methods of cargo
handling and ship propulsion for more economical, less labor-intensive operations. New
technologies in containerization and engine propulsion changed the way ships operated in
international commerce. Nations around the world modernized their ports for the
intermodal system of transportation introduced by the container revolution. Yet
throughout the innovation of the maritime industry, there remained an abundance of warbuilt ships that operated in commercial trade.
In the mid-1950s, in fact, the American-flag merchant marine was mainly
composed of World War II-era ships. These ships were built for quantity, not quality,
and the quality of steel being used combined with the new method of all-welded
construction was causing cracks in the ships’ plating. This problem was so prevalent that
it resulted in ships breaking in half not only under the stress of sea conditions, but also
while moored at the dock. Because these ships were used so widely in the commercial
trades, many more casualties occurred in the 1950s and 1960s due to cracks in the steel
plate.
The problems with cracks in all-welded construction of ships during World War II
was early demonstrated by the new tanker, Schenectady, when it broke in half at the dock
on the evening of January 16,
1943 shortly after it completed
its sea trials. (See Figure 3.)
In the old system of ship

Figure 3
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construction, steel plates were riveted together to form the hull. If a crack started in one
plate, it would in most cases stop at the riveted seam. However, with all-welded
construction, a crack would continue through the welded seam and across the subsequent
plates around the entire hull. While there were several contemporary instances of ships
breaking due to cracks in the steel, the Schenectady incident was fully reported in the
public news since it happened at the shipyard, where others were kept secret due to
security reasons associated with the war. 89
Shipyards began taking precautions against the complete breaking up of ships by
installing reinforcing straps and crack arrestors, but it was imperative to the war effort
that the shipbuilding program continue at its current rate of production. Investigation of
these incidents left uncertainty over whether the cracks were caused by the stress of allwelded construction, the quality of steel, or a completely different reason. Since the steel
plates were being manufactured by several different steel mills, the damages could not at
that time be definitely traced to substandard steel plating. The Maritime Commission did
not want to reduce steel production by imposing higher standards on the steel mills, and
since the cause of the cracks had not been specifically pinned down to faulty steel plating,
production continued as before. 90
Further investigation of this matter after the war showed that it was not only the
welded construction alone that was causing the problem, but also, as Dr. Constance
Tipper, a British metallurgist and mechanical engineer, showed, when exposed to certain
conditions, the poor quality of steel used in the war-time ships would become brittle and
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crack. 91 Even though the problems with cracks in the hull were well known, war-built
ships were sold to private interests, foreign and domestic, to be used in the deep-sea
shipping trade. During the 1950s and 1960s, there were reported instances of Liberty
ships and T-2 tankers breaking up at sea.
The Marine Merchant was a Liberty ship built in 1944 in Portland, Maine. In
1947, it was converted to carry bulk cargoes and was still engaged in that trade on April
14, 1961, when it carried a bulk cargo of sulfur on a voyage from Louisiana to Maine.
Late on the evening of April 13, the ship ran into heavy weather off the New Hampshire
coast. The captain ordered the vessel hove to in order to ride out the storm. Yet, at about
10:30 that evening the vessel’s hull cracked with a loud bang. The captain ordered the
engine stopped and the crew to ready the lifeboats. The hull fracture was so severe that
the radio antenna sagged with the damage to the hull and grounded out on the radar
scanner. The radio operator was eventually able to send a distress signal, following
emergency repairs to the antenna, which alerted the Coast Guard station in Boston,
Massachusetts and all ships in the area to the problem. Since the deck plating was
holding the two halves of the ship together, the captain felt that it was safer for the crew
to remain on board the ship than to brave the storm in the lifeboats. Early on the morning
of April 14, the captain decided weather conditions had improved while the ship’s
condition had worsened, so he ordered the crew to abandon ship. Later that morning, the
entire crew was picked up by two other ships in the area. Shortly after 9:00, the Marine
Merchant disappeared beneath the sea. The Coast Guard attributed this event in part to
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the “inherent weakness incident to structural notch sensitivity, common to welded vessels
of this class.” 92
Two T-2 tankers met similar ends on the same fateful day, February 18, 1952, in a
severe storm off the coast of Cape Cod. The Pendleton was built in 1944 and the Fort
Mercer was built in 1945, both part of the war-time shipbuilding program. The
Pendleton, carrying a cargo of kerosene and heating oil, experienced a hull failure with a
loud cracking sound at about 5:50am. The bow and stern sections separated, leaving the
crew on the bow section with no power. A distress signal was never sent. 93 Meanwhile,
a short distance to the east of the Pendleton, the Fort Mercer was also riding out the same
storm. At about 8:10am, the crew heard a loud bang and saw oil coming from below the
water in the midship area of the vessel. The captain slowed the ship and called the Coast
Guard for assistance. Coast Guard units then set out to help the Fort Mercer. Before
they arrived, the crew heard another loud bang from the hull, and then a little over an
hour later heard a third bang. The captain kept the Coast Guard and other ships in the
area advised of the condition of the Fort Mercer and urgently requested help. A short
time after noon, the ship split in two. 94
The Coast Guard conducted simultaneous rescue operations for the two ships.
Nine crewmen from the Pendleton perished while five were lost from the Fort Mercer. 95
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Both of these ships had been fitted with crack arresters and other modifications resulting
from the discoveries made during wartime operations.96 The Coast Guard determined in
both cases that the inherent nature of T-2 type vessels to crack was a factor. 97 This was
the end of service for the Pendleton. 98 However, the Fort Mercer remained in the cargo
trade for another twenty two years. The stern of the Fort Mercer was rebuilt with a new
bow section and ran until late 1983 when it was scrapped in Bangladesh. 99
While these wartime ships were being used for commercial post-war trade in the
mid-1950s, leaders in government and transportation sought more efficient methods of
powering ships and of moving cargo. In 1953, President Eisenhower in his “Atoms for
Peace” initiative introduced the possibility of using nuclear energy for peaceful means.
In 1965, the first nuclear-powered merchant ship to venture out on the high seas, the NS
Savannah, began cargo-passenger service. Cargo movement, however, by 1956 was on
its way to entering a whole new era in the transportation industry, containerization.
Malcolm McLean was the premier force in this transition.
McLean entered the trucking business in 1931 when there was no reliable
transportation in his home farming community in North Carolina. He expanded his
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business to several trucks, and began moving products along the east coast. While
waiting to unload his truck one day at the port of Hoboken, New Jersey, he noticed that
the movement of goods from truck to ship was very inefficient. From this experience, he
began a journey that led to the complete innovation of the shipping industry. 100
By 1955, McLean had built a prospering trucking company. Since Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) rules did not allow a person to control more than one
cargo transport company, McLean sold his thriving trucking business on the chance that
containerized cargo would be the wave of the future. He invented the steel-reinforced
corner-post structure of the shipping container so that it could be lifted on and off the
cargo ship and also be strong enough to stack one on top of another in the holds and on
the deck of the vessel. To prove that this new system of cargo movement would work,
McLean converted an oil
tanker for the carriage of
his new containers, and sent
the newly named Ideal X
(See Figure 4) on its way
from Newark, New Jersey

Figure 4

to Houston, Texas. When the cargo arrived undamaged and dry, the container revolution
had begun. 101
Several challenges to the spread of containerization arose after McLean proved it
was a feasible and efficient method to transport cargo. Ports now needed ample space to
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store and organize containers before and after ship transport, and they needed equipment
that would move the containers within the container yard and on and off the ships.
However, as more ports took a chance on containerization and succeeded, this led other
ports to modernize. In addition to adapting port cities to the new method of cargo
transportation, labor realized that this new process of cargo handling would require fewer
workers. The new technology would reduce manning on board ship and on the docks.102
Unlike containerization, another technological innovation of the 1950s, nuclear
power, failed to take hold. On April 25, 1955, President Eisenhower announced that his
program for the peaceful use of nuclear energy would include an atomic-powered
merchant ship. The
building of this ship, the
NS Savannah (See
Figure 5), was
Figure 5

authorized on July 30,

1956, as a joint effort of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Maritime
Administration (MARAD). 103 Construction proceeded with New York Shipbuilding in
charge of vessel fabrication while Babcock & Wilcox Co. was responsible for developing
the nuclear reactor. The ship was launched on July 21, 1959, and was ready for sea trials
in early 1962. 104
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The Savannah began as a showpiece, set up for combined passenger-cargo
service, as an announcement to the world that the United States was using the atomic
energy that proved so destructive in World War II for peaceful and prosperous purposes.
The ship began service in 1962 and continued what was basically a good-will mission
until August 20, 1965 when it entered the commercial cargo trade. After two years of
commercial operation by American Export Isbrandtsen Line, MARAD judged the
Savannah as too expensive to operate, and began the process for entering the ship into a
lay-up status. The U.S. Congress questioned the wisdom of this action since so much
time and money had been spent both on the ship and for crew training, and proposed
“that operation of the nuclear merchant vessel Savannah is in the best interest of the
United States of America and should continue.” 105 Because of the overwhelming desire
in Congress and in the maritime industry to keep the Savannah on the high seas,
MARAD awarded a charter to First Atomic Ship Transport, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, which lasted until 1970 when the NS
Savannah was laid up in Galveston, Texas. 106
Nuclear power never panned out as a popular method of propulsion for United
States-flag merchant ships. The Savannah was the first and only vessel of its type to be
registered under the American flag. Japan and Germany also tried to operate nuclearpowered merchant ships, but did not enter this field on a large scale. 107 Apprehension
about environmental concerns of nuclear energy and damaging effects of accidental
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release of nuclear radiation led to high insurance costs and the effort to ban nuclear plants
and ships from populated areas. 108 The extra cost of larger, technically trained crews
when combined with insurance and other operating costs made the Savannah too
expensive for MARAD to keep in operation under its allotted budget. MARAD
determined that the Savannah had “operated in demonstration and experimental service
from 1962 to 1970, realizing all objectives set for it,” 109 and it moved on to research
other types of propulsion such as the gas turbine. 110

Vietnam and the Continuing Deterioration of the U.S. Merchant Fleet
In 1965, the United States again found itself fighting a war far from home, and
once again troops needed a continuous flow of supplies. By the mid-1960s, the American
war fleet, and thus the major part of the American fleet as a whole, was approaching
twenty years of service. This was usually considered the useful life of a ship. Despite
subsidies provided for in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, not enough new construction
took place to furnish sufficient replacement tonnage for wartime needs. Bulk carriers in
the commercial fleet were also supplied from the pool of war-built ships. Ships built in
the 1940s were modified in the 1960s to extend their service lives. U.S. shipping laws
allowed shipowners to build midsections in foreign shipyards for these wartime ships. As
long as the midsection was installed in the United States, the ship was eligible to register
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in the U.S. and carry cargos specifically reserved by the Jones Act and cabotage laws for
American-flag ships. Shipowners operated these old vessels until they were no longer
safe, and at the end of profitable government-sponsored voyages that were intended to
bolster the fleet, many were sent to scrapyards overseas without being replaced by new
ships.
Troops in the Vietnam conflict would be receiving their critical support from the
same ships that supported their fathers in World War II. The Department of Defense
worked closely with the Maritime Administration to activate vessels from the National
Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF) to help fulfill sealift needs in Vietnam with ships left over
from World War II. 111 Seamen who sailed on these ships felt the brunt of the
deterioration brought on by heavy service in World War II followed by an extended idle
period. A merchant seaman who received an award for his courage during an explosion
in 1967 on board his ship, the Margarett Brown, had an unfavorable opinion of the
American merchant marine. Alfred D. Tuck said that the Margarett Brown, built in
1946, was “one of the decrepit rust buckets that merchant sailors are forced to ship out
on.” 112 He stated that ships of the American merchant fleet were being “held together
with baling wire,” and he described an incident where “a sailor put his foot through the
bottom of his lifeboat during a lifeboat drill.” 113
Although several American shipping liners operated newer, more efficient ships,
these ships were in regular commercial service. Sailing routes that were essential to
American trade, liner companies operated on regular schedules with regular customers.
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When defense needs required that these ships be called to service in Vietnam, the routes
left open were filled by foreign-flag ships. The liner companies then became concerned
about their post-war operations and whether or not they would regain their previous
service on their liner routes. 114
Another problem was whether or not enough merchant seamen could be found to
man the nation’s ships during the Vietnam War. With the activation of so many NDRF
ships, maritime unions faced the problem of providing seafarers for ships already in
commercial service and for the more than 100 ships activated from the NDRF. To fulfill
the increased manning demands, unions turned to retired members and trained seamen
working in shoreside positions. 115
In a message to Congress on October 23, 1969, President Richard Nixon
addressed the problem of the dwindling American merchant fleet. His first sentence
summed up the crisis: “The United States Merchant Marine – the fleet of commercial
ships on which we rely for our economic strength in time of peace and our defense
mobility in time of war – is in trouble.” 116 He recognized this trouble as coming from
both government and the maritime industry. Nixon challenged all parties to join in
rebuilding the American merchant marine. He proposed several ways to restructure the
subsidy provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to reduce government
expenditures while revitalizing the shipping industry. 117
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Congress revised the provisions of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 according to
the President’s proposals, adding amendments that have come to be known as the
Merchant Marine Act of 1970. Although some ships were built as a result of Nixon’s
efforts, most notably the
“San Clemente” class
supertankers (See Figure
6), 118 the program fell far
short of revitalizing the
fleet. In effect, it enabled
subsidies to continue, but

Figure 6

the cost of building a ship in the United States remained high.
Into the 1980s, the United States merchant fleet still contained World War IIvintage ships. While companies were building new types of vessels, such as container
ships and bigger oil tankers, many ships used in the bulk cargo trades were those of the
World War II era. The trend in this part of the industry was to repair and renovate the
existing ships rather than build a new fleet. Preference cargos and coastwise trade in the
United States was limited to American-flag ships that were built in the United States.
These were lucrative trades if the owner could save money by using an existing ship
without putting much money into maintenance and upkeep. If an old ship could be kept
running, a shipowner would not have to face the high cost of building a new ship in a
118
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U.S. yard. One example of the renovation and continued use of an aging World War IIbuilt ship, the Fort Mercer, has already been mentioned. Other ships during the early
1980s were not as lucky as the Fort Mercer, which made it to the scrap yard. Instead
they went down while underway taking most if not all of their crews with them.
Hearings held on the converted war-era T-2 tanker, Marine Electric (See Figure
7), which sank off
the coast of
Virginia in
February 1983,
bared the basic
problems. Of the

Figure 7

34-man crew, there were three survivors. When questioned by the U.S. Coast Guard, the
three surviving crewmembers testified that the Marine Electric was in poor structural
condition. The chief mate, Robert Cusick, gave the Coast Guard detailed descriptions of
rotting steel on board the ship, particularly in the vessel’s hatch covers. Cusick had made
a diagram of the ship’s hatch covers in early January 1983, and submitted the list to the
ship’s captain, indicating the areas that were in need of repair. Many steel repairs had
already been made to the deck plating and hatch covers during the first part of 1982 with
maritime contractors installing doubler plates on deck and cropping out and renewing
sections of the steel plating in the ballast tanks. Cusick testified that he attempted to
patch the holes in the hatch covers with a marine epoxy called “Red Hand,” but the
repairs were not holding under the working conditions of the ship. 119
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The Marine Electric was due for its required drydocking by April 15, 1983, so
temporary repairs continued on certain sections of the deck plating. The April 15 date
was an extension of the original drydocking requirement, granted by the Coast Guard
after a December 1982 mid-term inspection performed by a Coast Guard marine
inspector at Brayton Point, Massachusetts. Even though the inspector did not go forward
of the deck house due to ongoing cargo operations, he recommended that his superiors
grant a drydock extension. The captain and chief engineer agreed that the ship did not
have any problems that could not wait until mid-April, and so on January 6, 1983, the
Coast Guard granted the requested extension. From this point until the sinking, the crew
performed temporary repairs to holes in the hatch covers and to the ship’s ballast tanks
and hull in an attempt to keep the ship operating until the drydocking in April. 120
The lead investigator, Captain Dominic Calicchio, exposed the issue of the
deterioration of the American fleet and the lax inspections that allowed ships like the
Marine Electric to continue operating. He and the other investigators in the Marine
Electric case recommended an examination of the Coast Guard Commercial Vessel
Safety Program for improvement of marine inspector qualifications. Further in reference
to vessel inspections, Captain Calicchio found that even though many American Bureau
of Shipping (ABS) inspectors were quite experienced in the maritime industry, since they
maintained a close relationship with the shipping company, they were not impartial
inspectors. ABS was the classification society used by most American shipping
companies to certify their ships as seaworthy. It conducted periodic inspections and
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issued documentation necessary for a ship to legally sail. ABS was paid by the
shipowner for its services.
In an attempt to make the shipping companies and captains more responsible,
Captain Calicchio and his colleagues recommended that the Fleet Director of Marine
Transport Lines and Captain James Farnham, the Marine Electric’s permanent captain
who was on leave when the ship was lost, be indicted in federal court for allowing the
continued operation of the Marine Electric in an unseaworthy condition. 121
The loss of the Marine Electric prompted an investigation by a reporter from the
Philadelphia Inquirer, Robert Frump, in which the deteriorating condition of the U.S.flag merchant marine was brought to the attention of the public. 122 After Cusick testified
before the Coast Guard on February 17, 1983, Frump recounted his story in the February
18th issue of the Philadelphia Inquirer. 123 He then began a crusade against the aging
ships of the merchant marine.
In a series published in the Inquirer at the beginning of May 1983, entitled “Death
Ships,” Frump addressed the problems of the aging American merchant fleet. He argued
that the American merchant marine had arrived at its current condition through the
acquiescence of the U.S. government to lobbying pressures of the shipowners and labor
unions for greater government protection and subsidies. He stated that all parties to the
maritime issue, including the government, blamed international competition, with its use
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of cheap foreign labor, for the decline of the maritime industry. Frump, however, alleged
that government protection and subsidies had promoted the use of aging, deteriorating
ships instead of the building of a new fleet. Without addressing the solution to these
various maritime industry problems, Frump sympathized with the seamen who were
forced to sail on deteriorating ships simply to remain employed, and sought to rid the
fleet of ships like the Marine Electric. 124
Many seamen were aware of the deteriorating condition of the ships they were
sailing aboard during the 1980s. Most were also reluctant to report these deficiencies,
because if the ship was taken out of service, all it meant to the seamen was
unemployment. If the ship was not taken out of service, the owner could always find
another seafarer to take the place of one who left the ship or who complained about its
condition. New ships were not being constructed for the American fleet at a rate
sufficient to replace the aging ships as they were taken out of service. When a ship was
scrapped, there was no certainty of a job on board another. Some officers who ultimately
sailed aboard the old ships on their last voyages hadn’t sailed in over a year or were so
broke that they couldn’t even afford their union dues. 125
The plight of the industry in the early 1980s, as far as seamen were concerned,
was summed up by the thoughts of one seaman at the Philadelphia hiring hall in May of
1983: “If the Marine Electric pulled in here tomorrow, I’d get on board. … I’ve got a
wife, two kids and a mortgage and I haven’t worked in six months.” 126
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In his “Death Ship” series, Frump mentioned another war-era ship that was lost
earlier in the 1980s, the SS Poet. 127 Early on the morning of October 24, 1980, the Poet
left the port of Philadelphia loaded with bulk grain bound for Alexandria, Egypt. The last
known communication with the ship was a ship to shore radio call from the third mate to
his wife on the evening of October 24th. On November 3rd, when the owner had not heard
from the ship since its departure message, it notified the Coast Guard that the Poet was
missing. Despite five days of attempting to contact the Poet and an additional ten days of
searching by aircraft and ship, no sign of the Poet was ever found and none of its crew
was ever heard from again. 128
The U.S. Coast Guard investigation uncovered that the Poet’s intended track
would have taken it through a severe storm on October 25-26. While the Coast Guard
was unable to determine the cause of the loss, it noted the deterioration of the hatch cover
for number 1 hold. Several repairs had been made to the hatch cover, but permanent
repairs had not been completed. Investigators surmised that a complete structural failure
of the hull may have occurred, which caused the vessel to sink quickly. This would
account for the lack of any distress signal or debris. 129
While the cause of the Poet’s disappearance has never been determined, Frump
may have added it to his exposé on “Death Ships” since it was built in 1944 as part of the
World War II shipbuilding program. Similar to the Marine Electric and many other war-

127

Philadelphia Inquirer, May 1, 1983, A01.

128

U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard. Marine Casualty Report, SS Poet:
Disappearance in the Atlantic Ocean after Departure from Cape Henlopen, Delaware on 24 October 1980
with Loss of Life. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation Report and Commandant’s Action, 12
April 1982.
129

Marine Casualty Report, SS Poet, 56-57.

66
built ships, the Poet was modified in 1965 to carry bulk cargo. 130 Also, the sister ship of
the Poet, the SS Penny, was actively targeted by Frump as an example of an accident
waiting to happen. 131
The Penny was being run in a deteriorated condition by a company owned by
Henry J. Bonnabel. Bonnabel, who also owned the ill-fated Poet, had interests in several
old bulk ships that were running government cargoes overseas. Many of his ships were
in a rusted and dilapidated condition, but government preference cargoes were allowed to
be carried by these old ships since they were built in the United States and flew the
American flag, even though the idea behind subsidies and cargo preference laws was to
promote the building of new American ships. Frump’s articles became an impediment to
Bonnabel’s previously unfettered operations since the Coast Guard was now in the
spotlight for approving the sailing of ships that weren’t making it to their next ports. The
heightened awareness of the dangers of the old war-built ships after the Marine Electric
incident led the Coast Guard to apply its safety regulations more strictly.
The Coast Guard in Tampa, Florida caught up with the Penny while it was docked
in Tampa and performed an inspection prior to allowing it to sail. After a thorough
examination, the Coast Guard pulled the vessel’s Certificate of Inspection, a Coast Guard
document required on board American ships in order to legally sail, and held the ship in
Tampa until a long list of repairs was completed. 132 Feeling the increased pressure of the
more stringent Coast Guard inspections following the Marine Electric incident, in
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October 1985, Bonnabel requested documentation that would allow the Penny one last
cargo overseas on its way to the scrap yard. After safety repairs were completed, the
Penny set sail on its last trip on October 25 carrying a profitable government cargo on the
way to the scrap yard. Bonnabel also disposed of some of his other old ships in the same
lucrative manner. Since the Coast Guard was now requiring owners of the old ships to
make expensive repairs in order to keep them running, numerous ships of the war-time
fleet were laid up or scrapped. Thus, a program of government cargo preference meant to
subsidize the maintenance of a strong American merchant fleet, led to profits for
shipowners while, without building new ships, they sold their old ships for millions of
dollars for scrap at the end of the government-sponsored voyages. 133

Is There Hope For The American Fleet?
The American merchant marine was trapped in a downward spiral. Innovation in
ship propulsion and cargo carrying and handling methods could not alone keep the
industry at its post-World War II height. By the mid-1980s, then, American-flag ships
and American seamen were disappearing at an alarming rate.
At times, labor union pressures did not end with the best results for seafarers.
Conflicting goals and ideologies between the many unions representing American
officers and seamen more often than not damaged labor’s bargaining position with
management. The failure of seamen to unite behind a common cause led to an
inefficiency that made foreign-flag operations attractive to many shipowners. This
animosity also allowed shipowners to shop for the best deal among the several unions.
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As the shipowners played one union against another, unions were forced to accept lower
wages to win vessel contracts. 134
As containerized cargo and automated engine rooms became more popular in the
maritime industry, the number of ships needed for cargo transport decreased along with
the number of seamen required to operate the ships. While modern ships did not require
the same size crew as the older merchant ships, the American seamen’s unions fought to
keep the shipboard manning scales the same on board both types of ship. The tension
that this caused between labor and management could have been avoided if the older
ships had been replaced with new ones, as was intended by the subsidies offered in the
Merchant Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970. This would have kept the American merchant
fleet strong, and labor would not have been as concerned about job loss among its
members.
After the Marine Electric sank, resulting in the loss of most of its crew, the old
ships that were keeping many seafarers employed were taken out of service. The Coast
Guard, under public scrutiny after the loss of the Poet and the Marine Electric, could not
afford to continue letting American seamen risk their lives on board these ships. Rather
than conducting costly repairs on board ships that were 40 years old, the owners decided
to go for one last lucrative government cargo as they sent their ships to the scrapyard.
These ships would not be replaced by modern vessels under the American-flag.
Since the United States government actively supported the growth of flags of
convenience, it was not averse to allowing its nation’s merchant ships to migrate toward
open registries. Several shipowners took this route to higher profits. The many benefits
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of flag of convenience registries, coupled with the fact that the main registries in Liberia
and Panama had close ties to the United States government, encouraged the flight of
shipowners toward these liberal alternatives to the strict regulations and higher costs of
the American flag. U.S. government policy as stated in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
had been reduced to political rhetoric as government actions contradicted its words in the
implementation of maritime policy.
As the Reagan administration entered its second term in office, Congress
attempted again to reduce subsidies to the merchant marine by allowing U.S.-flag liners
to enter into rate agreements with other international carriers. This act was the first piece
of legislation to restate government maritime policy in words other than those used in the
Merchant Marine Act of 1936. The focus in the 1984 act shifted from an emphasis on
maintaining an American-flag merchant fleet to carry domestic and foreign water-borne
commerce, as stated in the 1936 act, to the goal of encouraging more efficient
international shipping with less U.S. government interference. The Shipping Act of 1984
addressed national security needs by promoting “the development of an economically
sound and efficient United States-flag liner fleet….” 135
While the Shipping Act of 1984 attempted to approach the needs of the U.S.-flag
merchant fleet in a different manner, government maintenance of the same maritime
policy from 1936 through 1984, without enacting measures to support its policy, had by
1984 caused considerable damage to the structure of the American merchant marine.
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Chapter 4: Cooperation and Maritime Reform, 1984-2006
Instead of encouraging the maintenance of a viable American-flag merchant
marine, the subsidy system originally set up in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
established limitations and rules which led to a steep decline in American tonnage.
Budget cuts in the 1980s ended some maritime subsidies, and the Reagan administration
proposed new legislation to remove government influence from the operation of U.S.-flag
merchant ships. As the focus of American maritime policy shifted to the liner fleet,
national security policy changed to meet the needs of the post-Cold War world. With the
American-flag fleet continuing to shrink, shipowners, shippers, labor, and shipyards
realized that as long as they argued amongst themselves, the federal government would
not act to help them.
The Reagan administration’s attempt to release merchant shipping from the
trappings of subsidy regulations was accompanied by cuts in subsidy appropriations. The
Shipping Act of 1984 allowed American-flag shipping companies to better associate with
their foreign competition to stabilize shipping prices. While this provided some relief in
the liner trades, it did not prevent the consequences of bad business decisions made by
American shipping executives. Malcolm McLean would once again be in the spotlight of
container shipping, but this time with negative results for the American-flag fleet.
When the Cold War ended in 1989, trouble in the Persian Gulf led to another
massive sealift, again to fight a war far from home. Several small campaigns followed
into the 1990s, and the government realized that it was increasingly relying on foreignflag shipping and government-owned ships to meet its sealift needs. Government ships
operated by the Military Sealift Command and the Maritime Administration would
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become important for national security needs, but without a commercial fleet,
experienced American seafarers would be harder to find.
The American merchant marine looked to the government to bolster the
commercial fleet. Cooperation within the maritime industry drove this new effort toward
maritime reform. Maritime unions and ship managers set aside their differences in the
interest of maritime promotion. Seamen’s unions ended decades of internal animosity.
Government aid to shipyards allowed modernization of American facilities. The relaxing
of tension within the industry opened the door for Congressmen who had been trying to
pass maritime reform legislation to finally realize their goal. Efforts by Senators Ted
Stevens, Daniel Inouye, Trent Lott, and John Breaux, and Representative Gerry Studds,
all from states with maritime and shipyard constituents, led to the enactment of new
legislation to revitalize the U.S.-flag fleet.
When the government took an active role in developing new legislation to aid the
maritime industry and maritime parties worked together, changes were made. The
Shipping Act of 1984, addition of new militarily useful ships to the government reserve
fleets, and the Maritime Security Program offered new incentives to the American-flag
merchant marine. When the parties within the maritime industry cooperated, Congress
took positive steps toward maintaining an American-flag merchant fleet.

Liner Shipping and the Shipping Act of 1984
Containerization and the renovation of ports around the world to accommodate
containerized cargo dominated the 1980s and 1990s. The size and capacity of container
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ships grew. (See Figure 8.) Ships with roll on/roll off (ro/ro) 136 capacity (See Figure 9)
also came more into favor during this time period, especially due to their usefulness for
military surge sealift
operations (See Figure
10). 137 Efficiency of
moving cargo was eons
ahead of where it was in the
mid-twentieth century.

Figure 8

Ships that formerly needed weeks to load and discharge their cargoes were now in and
out of port in hours. Congress again tried to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to
entice American shipowners to register under the U.S. flag. While the attempt to amend
the half-century old act
failed, Congress also
introduced new legislation
which became the Shipping
Act of 1984. The new law
removed government
restrictions on liner
shipping companies that

Figure 9
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desired to enter into trade conferences with their foreign competitors. Nevertheless,
American-flag shipping companies continued to collapse.
Congress debated two pieces of maritime reform legislation in 1983. Regulatory
reform was split off from maritime promotional programs. Both bills proposed changes
in the maritime industry that would remove government interference from business
operations. Congress passed the
Shipping Act of 1984, but the bill that
was introduced as the Merchant
Marine Act of 1983 was defeated.
Under their operating subsidy
contracts with the government,
shipowners were required to replace
ships in their fleets once they

Figure 10

reached a certain age. American law compelled subsidized shipowners to build these
new ships in the United States. Since building a ship in the United States cost about three
times as much as building overseas, many shipowners could not afford to replace their
aging ships without government construction subsidies. 138 The Maritime Administrator,
Admiral Harold Shear, expressed the Reagan administration’s view on construction
subsidies in hearings over the bill: “At present there is no intention of this Administration
to continue with construction-differential subsidies.” 139 Shipowners were then required
to build new ships in the United States without government financial aid.
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The 1983 bill was an effort to amend the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 to allow
shipowners to acquire ships from foreign sources. Foreign-built ships could be registered
under the American flag and immediately carry preference cargoes. Congress had
enacted a temporary measure in 1981 that allowed shipowners similar opportunities. As
a result, several American liner companies placed shipbuilding orders in yards overseas
before the stated deadline. The Merchant Marine Act of 1983 would have permanently
removed the requirement for subsidized operators to build their ships in America. 140
American shipyards were in as dire straights as the American-flag merchant
marine and met these efforts with fierce opposition. Congressmen from states with
shipbuilding interests such as Maine and Texas, as well as shipyards and shipbuilding
labor unions vigorously fought passage of these amendments. The industry was still split
due to shipyard dissention, but a major step toward cooperation in the rest of the industry
happened at the hearings before the House subcommittee on Merchant Marine when
shipboard labor unions and shipowners united in their efforts to pass the bill. 141 Even so,
the shipyard lobby proved its influence when the Merchant Marine Act of 1983 was
defeated.
With the industry still split on promotional aid, the Reagan administration
proposed a separate bill to achieve regulatory reform. Many new container and roll
on/roll off (ro/ro) ships entered into the liner trades where they maintained punctual
schedules and served well-defined routes. Antitrust laws hindered American-flag liner
companies from full participation in international liner conferences. Even though
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Congressional debate showed concern over allowing select industries to bypass antitrust
laws, 142 Congress took an active step toward helping the struggling industry with new
maritime legislation in the Shipping Act of 1984.
Shipping nations competing on the same route and offering the same types of
carriage services often entered into liner conferences. A shipping liner that was a party to
“any type of formal or informal agreement between ship owners that restrict[ed]
competition” was a member of a liner conference. 143 Liner conference manipulation of
competition was not new to the twentieth century. After the invention and widening use
of steamships in the nineteenth century allowed for scheduled departures and arrivals,
British shipowners became the largest shipping liner operators. To organize their
shipping trade, they began protecting and building their interests through conferences. 144
Contemporary Americans were extremely averse to the monopolistic practices that were
integral to shipping conference techniques, and in the Shipping Act of 1916 specifically
outlawed anticompetitive tactics of liner conferences like deferred rebates 145 and fighting
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ships. 146 The 1916 act also created the United States Shipping Board and gave it
authority to disapprove of agreements between carriers. 147 Nevertheless, American
companies continued into the 1960s using forbidden tools of the conference system to
attract shippers and compete with other shipping lines. 148
As U.S. government departments were reorganized throughout the twentieth
century, “the administration of the regulatory provisions of the shipping laws” had shifted
to the Federal Maritime Commission, created in 1961. 149 The Department of Justice,
however, maintained control over antitrust issues in the United States. Under pressure
from the Department of Justice, the Federal Maritime Commission began to examine
liner conferences more closely. American-flag shipping companies were not able to enter
conferences with foreign shipowners if the provisions of the conference violated United
States antitrust laws. The Shipping Act of 1984 provided an exemption from the antitrust
laws for shipowners. To appease shippers who fought against conference price-control
measures, the Shipping Act included provisions that would ban deferred rebates and
fighting ships, and would allow a shipowner to change its prices on ten days’ notice to
other members of the conference. 150
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While the Shipping Act of 1984 was the first positive step Congress made to
assist the maritime industry in over a decade, relaxation of the antitrust laws in the
shipping industry did not provide the boost the industry needed to recover from its woes.
Some large liner companies did not participate in the conference system. Taiwan had
recently launched the Evergreen Line which set its rates independent of conference
participants. Evergreen proved a dangerous foe to the American-flag United States
Lines, one of the largest container companies in the U.S.-flag fleet. Led by Malcolm
McLean, U.S. Lines introduced a fleet of super-containerships into the market in the early
1980s in direct competition with Evergreen Lines.
Malcolm McLean entered the shipping business in the early 1950s after selling his
trucking company. He began in 1955 by purchasing Waterman Steamship Company,
which had emerged from World War II in good financial shape. From Waterman,
McLean began his endeavor into containerized cargo, eventually splitting off one division
and creating Sea-Land in 1960. 151
United States Lines originated as a government-owned shipping company that
was created by the U.S. Shipping Board after World War I to operate passenger ship
service in the North Atlantic. In the 1920s, the feeling in the United States was that
business should be conducted by businessmen, not by the government. In 1926, the
Shipping Board opened bidding for the purchase of United States Lines. After a period
of uncertainty in the operation of U.S. Lines, two of the larger shipping companies in
America, Dollar Line and International Mercantile Marine, formed a joint venture and
bought United States Lines in 1931. Dollar Line was mainly a West Coast operation and
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had been operating in the Pacific trade since the beginning of the twentieth century.
International Mercantile Marine, on the other hand, was an Atlantic-based company that
was created by J.P. Morgan in 1901-1902. McLean’s and U.S. Line’s interests converged
in 1977 when he purchased the line after selling his stock in Sea-Land. 152
Before long, McLean endeavored on a bold effort to build a fleet of supercontainerships, called Econships, (See Figure 11) which were slower in speed than other
new containerships in world
trade, but would offer reduced
shipping prices because of their
size. U.S. Lines availed itself of
the temporary opportunity in
1982 buy merchant ships on the

Figure 11

foreign market, and McLean ordered twelve Econships built in a shipyard in South
Korea. 153
McLean, however, misjudged many of the world economic factors he had counted
on when planning his new fleet. Fuel prices, which had risen during the Carter
administration, had dropped in the early 1980s. McLean’s slower ships then did not have
as great an efficiency value over his faster competitors. McLean also overestimated the
amount of cargo available in ports around the world that were large enough to
accommodate the tremendous size of the new ships. As these disadvantages mounted,
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United States Lines grew deeper in debt. 154 In November 1986, McLean Industries
declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy and halted both the worldwide and North Atlantic
shipping services of United States Lines. 155
With United States Lines gone, American President Lines and Sea-Land Services
were the major container liners in the American-flag fleet. When Congress did not enact
a new subsidy law for American-flag ships in the early 1990s, these liners requested
permission from the Maritime Administration to re-flag part of their existing fleet, and
also flag new ships under foreign registries. By 1995, these companies were operating
ships under both the American flag and foreign flags. 156
Maritime unions representing ships’ officers, the International Organization of
Masters, Mates, & Pilots and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association District 1,
stopped trying to keep these ships under the American flag. Instead, they bargained with
the companies to retain American deck and engine officers from their unions on board
while employing unlicensed seamen from foreign countries. 157

American-Flag Ships and National Security
The Persian Gulf War in 1991 showed the United States that it would need to rely
not only on its national merchant fleet, but also on foreign-flag ships to supply its troops.
Much of the effort was getting the mass of equipment in place for the Desert Shield and
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Desert Storm operations. Relatively modern ports in the region, reliable communications
links, a ready supply of fuel oil, and the short duration of the ground conflict reduced
sealift capacity needed for a successful campaign. 158 Nevertheless, more than fifteen
million tons of support materials for the Persian Gulf campaign traveled overseas by
water. The United States moreover conducted a six-month military build up prior to the
start of the ground war. Foreign-flag ships contributed to the sealift effort to carry the
equipment to the Persian Gulf area due to the lack of adequate U.S.-flag tonnage. Of the
ships needed, “44 percent were foreign-flag ships, 41 percent were government-owned
ships, and a mere 15 percent were privately owned U.S.-flag merchant ships.” 159
After the war, Congressional concern over American sealift capacities led to
hearings in the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. 160 The only
proactive legislation enacted to aid the merchant marine since 1936 had been in 1970 and
1984. With the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy objectives changed, and
military preparedness shifted from global conflict to smaller, isolated campaigns. A
reevaluation of merchant shipping capability was in order, yet George H.W. Bush
administration priorities did not include such an agenda. Nevertheless, the existing
maritime programs would have to fulfill sealift needs if the military was to succeed in its
mission. The Military Sealift Command and Ready Reserve Force provided the majority
of the shipping tonnage used in the Persian Gulf effort. However, foreign tonnage was
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still necessary and carried approximately twenty percent of the dry cargo required for the
campaign. 161
The Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled ship logistics for the Persian
Gulf War. During the initial surge sealift into the area, MSC used seven fast sealift ships
(See Figure 12) plus the ships on standby in the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).
The fast sealift ships could travel at speeds up to thirty knots and were specially
configured for the carriage of military
vehicles. 162 These seven ships carried
about ten percent of the dry cargo for
the entire Persian Gulf campaign. 163
The MPF, a collection of
strategically located ships that remain
fully loaded and wait to be called into
action, also participated in the first

Figure 12

wave of supply to the Persian Gulf. After the MPF ships delivered their standby cargoes,
they proceeded in the effort to keep the troops supplied throughout the operation. 164
The Ready Reserve Force (RRF) contained the next supply of government ships,
but unlike the MPF ships, the RRF ships were not on station, not fully loaded, and did not
have a full crew on board. Once activated by the Maritime Administration, RRF ships
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were turned over to and operated by MSC. 165 The United States faced many of the same
problems it encountered in Vietnam during the sealift operation for the Persian Gulf.
Ships in the RRF had deteriorated from an extended idle period and in many cases did not
meet their designated breakout schedules due to machinery problems. Seafarers were
also in short supply because of the reduction of the commercial merchant fleet, and
unions were again forced to go to their retirement roles and to trained seamen working in
shoreside positions. Before half of the RRF ships were underway, most of the pool of
available seafarers had been exhausted. 166 The government was also reluctant to pull
liner ships off their normal trade routes since foreign ships could then slip into their spots,
so it instead chartered foreign tonnage to move the military cargo. 167
During the Persian Gulf War, the U.S. military discovered the benefits of
maintaining adequate roll on/ roll off (ro/ro) capacity for emergency sealift actions, but it
also realized that these ships were not well represented in the American-flag fleet. Ro/ro
ships could be quickly loaded and quickly discharged and were ideal for carrying military
vehicles. In the unstable atmosphere of military maneuvers, the faster the equipment
arrived in the hands of the troops, the better. The Ready Reserve Force was modernized
in the early 1990s to include a surge sealift force of ro/ro ships. The U.S. government
built several Large Medium Speed Ro/Ro ships (LMSRs) and purchased others to fulfill
the projected future needs of the military. 168
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A continuous maintenance program was also put in place for RRF ships needed
for surge sealift operations. Small maintenance crews comprised of seafarers were
placed on board these ships to alleviate some of the machinery problems faced during
ship breakouts for Operation Desert Shield. These seafarers would also provide an
experienced base for the crew called on to operate the ship when activated. 169
After the Gulf War ended, the United States became involved in various United
Nations and humanitarian missions in the 1990s throughout the world. U.S. efforts in
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and other trouble areas were aided by sealift missions undertaken
by commercial ships chartered by the military and by RRF ships when necessary.170 The
U.S. government realized, however, that the RRF was not all that the nation needed to
carry out its current and projected sealift needs. A U.S.-flag commercial fleet was still
required economically and for national security. The RRF was not structured to provide
the nation with a trained pool of seafarers in all shipboard positions. Only a viable
commercial fleet could provide the skilled people necessary to the program.

The Maritime Security Program
On the commercial side of the deep-sea American fleet, Congress passed the
Maritime Security Program in 1996. The law provided assistance only for a limited time
period. Before it expired, Congress amended and reauthorized the program in 2003.
Four senators in particular put forth a tenacious effort to provide the maritime industry
with much needed assistance. Senators Ted Stevens of Alaska, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii,
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Trent Lott of Mississippi, and John Breaux of Louisiana kept a close eye on matters
affecting the maritime industry as they attempted to pass new promotional legislation.
Not only did they consider methods to improve maritime matters, but they also conducted
oversight of requests of major U.S. liner companies to re-flag their ships elsewhere. The
active efforts of Congressmen like these finally provided new laws to aid the struggling
merchant marine.
After United States Lines went bankrupt, the two largest remaining U.S.-flag liner
companies, Sea-Land and American President Lines (APL), sought government help to
avoid that same fate. The Bush administration in 1990 attempted to reform the Operating
Differential Subsidy program. But without agreement of all the parties of the maritime
industry, the administration hesitated to act and no legislation was forthcoming. 171 Next,
the Clinton administration showed reluctance to support ongoing Congressional efforts at
maritime reform. Rather than wait to see if yet another maritime assistance proposal
would die in Congress, Sea-Land and APL petitioned the Maritime Administration
(MARAD) in 1993 for permission to re-flag some of their current ships and to register
new ships they were building under foreign flags. 172
These requests alarmed Congress since, despite the lack of enthusiasm of the
presidential administrations, it was currently in the process of developing maritime
promotional reform. It did not want the largest American-flag shipping companies to bail
out before it could realize its efforts. Representative Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, a
strong proponent of maritime reform in the House, supported an amendment to a
171
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maritime budget bill that stalled the re-flagging efforts until progress could be made on
new promotional legislation which was still in committee. 173 In the Senate, the
Subcommittee on Merchant Marine, attended by Senators Lott, Stevens, Inouye, and
Breaux, held oversight hearings on what Breaux termed “the unfortunate decision by the
two largest American shipping companies to begin reflagging their fleets under foreign
flags.” 174
While these Congressional efforts stalled American President Lines (APL) and
Sea-Land, it did not stop them. APL was completing construction of six new
containerships in foreign shipyards and wanted to register all of them under foreign flags.
MARAD approved the request under the condition that APL register these ships under a
flag which would give the U.S. effective control over the ships in time of emergency.
APL would also have to wait for the outcome of reform legislation in Congress before it
took action regarding re-flagging any of its existing fleet. 175 APL readily accepted these
conditions. 176
The maritime reform legislation being debated in Congress since 1992 finally
became law in 1996. The untiring efforts of Senators Stevens and Inouye during debate
over the bill in the Senate overcame objections and proposed amendments by Senator
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Charles Grassley of Iowa. The act passed by a vote of 88 to 10. 177 The Maritime
Security Act added a new section to the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 that created a new
subsidy structure for the American-flag fleet. The Maritime Security Program (MSP)
offered a $2.1 million dollar subsidy per ship to American-flag shipowners in return for
making the ships and their intermodal facilities available to the government in time of
national emergency. The program provided for a maximum of forty seven ships, and
attracted the attention of several liner shipping companies. 178
Shipyards did not oppose the MSP due to the revived Title XI loan guarantee
program which “provides a Government guarantee on commercial loans for ships built in
the United States.” 179 The Title XI program contained provisions to assist shipyards in
modernizing their yards and provided for loan guarantees of up to 87.5 percent of a 25year loan. 180
The original MSP was set for a ten-year term with appropriations for funding the
bill decided on an annual basis. 181 Proponents of the MSP, determined not to let a
program that was attracting and retaining ships in the American fleet lapse, began early to
improve and present another Maritime Security Program before the current one ended.
The result was the Maritime Security Act of 2003, which became effective, for the most
part, on October 1, 2004. New provisions raised the maximum number of ships in the
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program to sixty, and allotted $2.6 million dollars per ship with subsidy amounts to
increase over the new ten-year period. The MSP allowed priority entry into the program
by new tankers built in the U.S., thus trying to also give the shipbuilding industry a boost
without requiring that all ships in the program be American built. Appropriations for the
new program, however, remained subject to annual approval. 182
One mounting concern with the implementation of the Maritime Security Program
after its inception in 1996 was that more and more American-flag subsidized ships were
being operated by United States subsidiaries of foreign corporations. After the MSP
began in 1996, American President Lines, Lykes Lines, Farrell Lines, and Sea-Land, all
major U.S. liner shipping companies, sold out to foreign interests. By 2003, “all but eight
of the 47 MSP ships [were] run by U.S. intermediaries for overseas companies.” 183
Opponents to allowing foreign ownership of many of the ships slotted for national
security duties pressed for the problem to be resolved by changes made in 2003. But the
program continued on with parent companies based overseas pulling the strings of U.S.
subsidiaries operating MSP ships. 184 With so few American-owned shipping companies
that possessed ships which fit the requirements and needs of the MSP, United States
national security increasingly depended on the loyalty of foreign companies.

Where the Industry Stands Today
Little evidence exists today of the overwhelming lead in world shipping that the
United States possessed at the end of World War II. The bulk of the U.S.-flag fleet is
182
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comprised of the coastwise ships protected from foreign competition by the Jones Act,
the ships of the Maritime Prepositioning Force and the Ready Reserve Force, and a few
remaining containerships and ro/ro ships that operate commercially under subsidies
provided in the Maritime Security Program.
The Shipping Act of 1984 freed the international shipping business from many
U.S. antitrust law restrictions, but this was not enough to keep a viable liner fleet under
the U.S.-flag. While American companies could now participate in foreign liner
conferences, competition from liners outside the conferences took its toll. The over
tonnage of some shipping routes also caused rate wars to attract the limited cargo
available. The miscalculations of United States Lines and the flight of American
President Lines and Sea-Land to foreign flags with their new vessels continued the
decline of the American-flag merchant marine.
The hopes of today’s American-flag deep-sea fleet lie with the modernization of
the Ready Reserve Force and Military Sealift Command ships, and with the operation of
the Maritime Security Program. The last strict test of maritime sealift capability is now
in America’s distant memory. Military operations in the last thirty years have been short
term and have not required the continuous sealift that campaigns like World War II and
Vietnam relied upon. Fortunately, in recent conflicts American troops have not
noticeably suffered from the decreased tonnage capacity of the American-flag fleet.
However, the nation still relied on foreign resources instead of autonomous action.
When parts of the maritime industry began cooperating with each other, Congress
finally passed new maritime legislation. Maritime unions began to set aside long
histories of animosity and united to save the struggling industry. In 2001, the Seafarers

89
International Union and the National Maritime Union, the two largest unlicensed
seamen’s unions in the nation, merged into one interest “by a ‘nearly unanimous’
tally.” 185 The officers’ unions followed suit when the American Maritime Officers
(AMO) and the International Organization of Master Mates and Pilots (MMP) agreed in
2003 to greater cooperation between the unions. Also, the three largest officers’ unions,
AMO, MMP, and the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association (MEBA), all consented
to a tripartite agreement not to underbid each other when pursuing government
contracts. 186 Finally, a recent alliance between the AMO and the Seafarers International
Union of North America joined the interests of officers and seamen in the fight for a
stronger American-flag fleet. 187
While the maritime industry and Congress were uniting in some efforts at
reviving the American-flag merchant marine, the U.S. government still hesitated when
the issues became complicated. When it could please most of the people, Congress
moved forward. However, when reluctance of parties in the industry surfaced or if
American foreign policy would suffer, Congress backed up to the comfortable position of
words without deeds. The ambivalence of the United States toward its merchant marine
was summed up in a report by Kevin Baron of the Boston Globe when he referred to a
2002 hearing by the House Armed Services Committee regarding the concern over
foreign ownership of the majority of the ships in the MSP. “The hearing ended with
members of Congress expressing concern about the lack of US-owned ships but taking no
185
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action.” 188 As long as the U.S. government sits on the fence between talk and action,
cooperation by the parties comprising the maritime industry will be the only road toward
recovery of a strong American-flag merchant marine.
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